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Human beings, as a species, are capable of both incredible scientific and technical 
achievements, but also of deep scientific denial. In late 2012 while the Curiosity rover 
descended from a “sky crane”, to make a soft landing on the surface of mars (NASA. 
2012). many people were preparing for the end of the world, which they believed to 
have been predicted by the end of the Mesoamerican Long Count calendar (Hoopes 
2011). This thesis aims to determine the factors contributing to the establishment and 
persistence of irrational beliefs, and attempts to identify a means of response through 
science education. 
Humans find patterns in random noise, ascribe agents, intentions and emotions to 
completely natural phenomena, and overestimate their control over random chance. 
When our beliefs are challenged we become uncomfortable considering that we may be 
wrong, as such a possibility clashes with our ideal perception of ourselves. 
Subsequently we are convinced by arguments that agree with our preconceptions, even 
if they are illogical. This is a major obstacle to the communication of accurate scientific 
information. 
A series of workshops, comprising two 50-minute sessions, were held to assess the 
benefit of specific education to communicating the rationale of the principles of science. 
The workshops were held for two classes of a primary school (P1a, P1b), and two high 
schools classes (H1, H2). The competency of the classrooms was assessed for both 
their theoretical understanding of the ideas being communicated, and their application 
of this knowledge to their own experiments. Additionally the students’ knowledge of the 
principles of scientific methods was measured prior to, and one month after the 
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workshops, through interviews with a subset of students. The study found that two 
classes (P1a and H2) were able to demonstrate an improved understanding of the 
scientific method after the workshop (p<0.01). However H2 demonstrated the lowest 
ability to apply an understanding of the scientific method to their own experiments. This 
result suggested that while the H2 students were able to recall the specific information 
communicated, they were not able to apply this knowledge to practice. 
Communicating accurate scientific information to adults may not be sufficient to have 
them reconsider their irrational beliefs. For this reason it is important for science 
educators to give children the skills to both reason rationally, and to be able to appraise 
the quality of evidence and information they are exposed to. This can be achieved by 
focusing on the stated objectives within the ‘Nature of Science’ section of the New 
Zealand Science Curriculum. However it would also be beneficial to students to 
understand the innate human cognitive phenomenon that leads people to accepting 
irrational beliefs. This knowledge will empower the students to challenge not only the 
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In October 1958 the National Aeronautics and Space Administration was formed with 
the express intent of putting a man on the moon. Just over a decade later on July 20, 
1969, Neil Armstrong and Edwin “Buzz” Aldrin completed this task by stepping out of 
the from their landing module, onto the lunar surface (NASA. 2013).  Within this time 
frame of 11 years, aerospace research and engineering took us from simple satellite 
launchers, through manned space flights, to creating the capabilities of reaching the 
lunar surface, and finally to sending a three man team across the 380,000km to the 
moon, walking upon the surface, launching from the lunar surface, travelling the 
distance back to earth, re-entering the atmosphere and landing safely.  While the 
accomplishment of landing men on the moon is remarkable, the rate of scientific 
advancement in the lead up to this event was truly astounding. Few times in history 
have the capabilities of the human mind been demonstrated so acutely. When given the 
necessary resources and support, the potential future accomplishments of the human 
mind are beyond imagination. 
Conversely, citizens of in Indonesia's West Java province of Rawa Buaya have taken to 
lying across railway lines, in the believe that the irons will cure them from illnesses 
ranging from diabetes to insomnia (MacKinnon 2011). This peculiar behaviour began 
after stories spread of a man suffering from stroke-induced paralysis, who attempted to 
commit suicide by lying on the railway lines, only to be miraculously cured. Visitors to 
the railway track became such a problem that the city officials threatened penalties of 
up to three months in prison or substantial fines for people caught lying on the tracks. 
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Though this reduced the numbers of visitors, which peaked at around 50 per day, some 
people were still willing to risk prosecution, in the hope for a miracle. 
This places the human mind in a strange paradox. It has the capacity to land a man on 
the moon, while it simultaneously has the capacity to believe in the magical healing 
powers of railway lines. Lying on a railway track to encourage a health-related miracle 
indicates extreme irrationality yet such behaviour is extremely common and accepted in 
even the most highly developed societies all over the world. Demonstrating this is the 
global casino market, which was estimated to be worth 120 billion dollars in 2011 (PwC 
2011). This revenue is entirely generated by patrons losing money to the games, which 
are statistically designed to pay out less than they take. Casinos stand as temples to 
human irrationality.  
Understanding the disconnect between our ability to research, design, engineer  and 
flex our incredible mental capabilities, while also succumbing to misconceptions, 
superstitions and logical fallacies, is of immediate concern to the field of science 
communication. Understanding the appeal, establishment and maintenance of beliefs 
that exist in the absence of evidence, or despite evidence to the contrary (i.e irrational 
beliefs), is vital for any attempt to address the arguments of those belief systems.  
While it may be desirable for science communicators to pass off irrationality as a 
product of low education or intelligence, this is demonstrable untrue. Such is the case of 
Peter Duesburg, Professor of molecular and cell biology at the University of California, 
Berkeley, and world leading acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (A.I.D.S) denialist 
(Cohen 1994; Deer 2012). It cannot be argued that Peter Duesburg is uneducated nor 
uninformed, yet his opinion of the role human immunodeficiency virus (H.I.V) plays in 
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the establishment of A.I.D.S is at odds from effectively every researcher in the field 
(Cohen 1994). Peter Duesburg demonstrates that all people are able to establish and 
maintain irrational beliefs, and that intelligence, experience and information can be 
insufficient to counteract the innate irrational reasoning skills humans possess. 
This thesis seeks to investigate the irrational reasoning humans use, and why this 
reasoning seems so appealing, even in the face of explicit evidence to the contrary. 
This thesis also seeks to understand the role of misinformation, individual’s exposure to 
misinformation and how this misinformation influences people’s belief establishments. 
The importance of the scientific method in addressing these factors is then discussed.  
Finally this thesis tests the test the knowledge of children of their comprehension of the 
scientific method and reviews how effectively this information about the scientific 






The Way of the Master was a Christian television series, broadcast in over 100 
countries. On this show New Zealand-born evangelist Ray Comfort held a Cavendish 
banana and proclaimed “behold the atheist’s nightmare” (Comfort 2006). Comfort 
proceeded to list a series of physiological characteristics of the banana including a pull 
tab for opening, a perforated wrapper, and a curve towards the face with a pointed end 
for “ease of access”. All of which he proclaimed, testified to the genius of God’s design, 
despite bananas being the product of human-driven artificial selection since first being 
domesticated over 7000 years ago (Denham, Haberle et al. 2004). The presentation 
was such a sensation that it led Richard Dawkins to dub Mr. Comfort as the “Banana-
Man” (Dawkins 2009) and the led the National Centre for Science Education to produce 
banana shaped book-marks in response to an introduction written by Mr. Comfort, to the 
Origin of Species by Charles Darwin (National Centre for Science Education 2009). So 
how can a man hold the product of natural selection through artificial selection in his 
hand, and proclaim it to be evidence of the divine? 
To answer this question we need to understand human predisposition towards irrational 
beliefs and the inherent difficulties that all people naturally have with logic.  
 
1.1 Language and trust 
 
Humans are the only species on earth who have developed fully complex system of 
speech and speech comprehensions. The power of language results from the fact that it 
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allows words to substitute for direct experience (Harris 2010). This was an adaptation 
that helped our species to exchange information, make plans, express new ideas and 
totally change the appearance of the planet (Nowak 2000). However words can be used 
to perpetrate myths, or used to manipulate individuals to the benefit of the speaker. 
Consequently the evolutionary origins of speech have been described as the hardest 
problem in science (Christiansen and Kirby 2003). 
While many species can mimic human speech, no living non-human species has ever 
successfully communicated using language. This is not due to lack of will or effort 
(Hayes and Hayes 1951). Chimpanzees have demonstrated the ability to process some 
basic language, including sentences requiring syntax reversal(Savage-Rumbaugh, 
Murphy et al. 1993). This suggests the potential for language comprehension preceded 
the evolution of speech by several million years (Savage-Rumbaugh, Murphy et al. 
1993). This raises the question as to why speech is limited only to humans and not 
found in the animals that have had the potential to develop it for millions of years. 
The main obstacle may not be morphological, but instead rest in the fact that words are 
not immediately verifiable. For this reason it is very easy to deceive another individual 
either intentionally or unintentionally while this also carries no immediate cost to the 
deceiver (Smith 1994). If a signal is cost-free (e.g. “I will attack”) it would benefit the 
organism to constantly produce this signal. Subsequently an organism receiving the 
signal would eventually learn to ignore it. Thus the signal would be meaningless (Smith 
1994). Animals can only trust a signal from another animal if that signal carries some 
cost to that individual (Zahavi 1993; Smith 1994). Speech can be considered cost-free 
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signalling (Zahavi 1993). In non-human animals speech is hindered from developing 
simply because it is too easy to lie. It is much more reliable for these animals to ignore 
the cost-free signal, and read cues from signals that are not so easy to fake (Zahavi 
1993; Smith 1994). 
Ultimately the existence of language among humans reveals the strong role of trust 
during our evolution. While we will usually question a person’s motives for presenting us 
with information, humans innately desire to accept propositions as true without the need 
for evidence or experience (Harris 2010). This puts humans in a unique position of 
being at a particular risk of being deceived, while also being naturally trusting of 
information we receive. While we are also naturally an honest species, as it would not 
be possible for language to have arisen if we were constantly deceiving each other to 




In his landmark study B.F.Skinner (1948) reported superstition-like behaviour in 
pigeons. The pigeons were fed from hoppers set to timed intervals. Despite this periodic 
feeding mechanism, 8 of the 10 birds developed some form of conditioning, such as 
turning on the spot, pecking at certain part of their cages, or swaying their heads. These 
conditioned responses suggested the pigeons were behaving as if there were a causal 
relation their behaviour and the presentation of food, even though there was none.  
The responses of the pigeons in the study were later explained as behaviours that 
increase foraging success of pigeons (Staddon and Simmelhag 1971; Timberlake and 
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Lucas 1985). While this detracts from the idea of ‘pure’ superstition that Skinner 
reported, the study still revealed that organisms other than humans may behave 
irrationally in the misguided belief that their actions have a causal relationship to a 
phenomenon (Skinner 1948; Foster and Kokko 2009).  It has since been established 
that any animal with the capability of learning from the observation of coincidence is at 
risk of developing a superstition (Morse and Skinner 1957; Beck and Forstmeier 2007). 
Like the pigeons, human superstition is due to a misguided belief that we have a causal 
relationship where none exists. In humans this can be manifest as simply as crossing 
one’s fingers for luck, or blowing on dice at a craps table, or as extravagant as complex 
religious and cultural rituals. 
While a lot of superstition carries little cost to the observers, some have a significant 
cost. This can be in the form of sacrifices, offerings, personal suffering and even 
problem gambling (Joukhador, Blaszczynski et al. 2004). Yet there is no obvious benefit 
to holding a false belief. This puzzled early researchers of superstition, who noted the 
worldwide distribution and persuasiveness of superstitious beliefs. Some proposed 
benefits to superstitions included  the desire to satisfy a desire for knowledge (Scheibe 
1965) a sense of security from control (Moore and Tumin 1949) and social and cultural 
acceptance (Batson and Ventis 1982). While these factors undoubtedly play a role in 
supporting a false belief, alone they cannot adequately account for the selection of 
superstition by natural selection (Shermer 2011). 
For an explanation of the natural selection of superstition we need to consider the 
balance between believing a false positive (type one error), such as a superstition, and 
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ignoring a real pattern (type two error) (Beck and Forstmeier 2007; Foster and Kokko 
2009). A simple thought experiment proposed by Michael Shermer (2011), is to imagine 
you are a hominid on the plains of Africa, living 3 million years ago. If you hear a rustle 
in the grass you can either presume it is a danger to you, or merely the wind. In this 
thought experiment is easy to see the cost of a type one error is low, running away from 
the wind is a little embarrassing, but mostly harmless. However making a type two error 
has the potential to be extremely dangerous. The rustle in the grass may be caused by 
predator animals, rival hominids, or any number or potential threats that would reduce 
your capacity to pass on genetic material. In this case the hominids who assume the 
worst are risking less than those who exercise a sceptical rationalism. We are the 
descendants of those who ran (Shermer 2011). 
This mechanism was demonstrated by Foster and Kokko (2009). Through the use of 
statistical models they were able to demonstrate that whenever the cost of believing 
something false is less than the cost of not believing something true, natural selection 
will favour the superstitious-like behaviour. So while superstition is not directly the 
product of evolution, it is an inevitable by-product of the ability to recognise and learn 
patterns (Beck and Forstmeier 2007; Foster and Kokko 2009). The default position for 
our brains is to believe the patterns we think we see, even when none exist (Shermer 
2011). 
It is possible that individuals who suffer from clinical levels of anxiety and paranoia are 
simply the product of this pattern recognition. Increased vigilance is used to diagnose 
clinical anxiety (Mathews 1990; American Psychiatric Association 2000). This vigilance 
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manifests in individuals who have an abnormally high perception of threat (Green, 
Williams et al. 2003; Green and Phillips 2004), followed by an increased avoidance of 
the perceived threat, resulting in conditions such as clinical paranoia and schizophrenia 
(Green and Phillips 2004).  
The evolution of threat perception in humans has not only left us susceptible to 
superstition (Skinner 1948; Morse and Skinner 1957; Staddon and Simmelhag 1971; 
Mathews 1990; Foster and Kokko 2009; Shermer 2011; Shermer 2011), but also 
explains the far spectrum of clinical paranoia (Green, Williams et al. 2003; Green and 
Phillips 2004). It is important to understand the inclination of humans to perceive non-
existing patterns within random noise as an explanation of irrational belief and also as a 
predictor for belief patterns during their lifetimes.   
 
1.3 Design for intent 
 
A fundamental aspect of adult thought is the ‘teleological’ tendency to assume that 
objects exist for a purpose (Kelemen 1999b). This assumption is revealed by the 
common questions we ask when met with novel artefacts, such as “what is it for?” or 
“why does this exist?”. 
When asked to determine if series of objects has any functional design, over 30% of 
participants identified natural objects (e.g. a mountain or clouds) as having some 
function(Kelemen 1999a). This perception of design was even greater for biological 
organisms, such as a tiger or a tree, at around 70%, despite there being no more 
intrinsic purpose in an animal or plant than in a cloud or mountain.  
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Young children naturally assume even greater intended purposes than adults, making 
very little distinction in the perceived purpose of manmade artefacts, biological 
organisms, and completely natural phenomenon (Kelemen 1999a; Kelemen 1999b). 
When asked to identify the same objects as the adults in the previous paragraph, they 
perceived intent in all objects roughly evenly (Figure 1.1). This reveals that humans are 
virtually hardwired into thinking teleologically (Kelemen 1999b). 
 
When viewing simple lifeless geometric cardboard cut-outs filmed via stop-motion, most 
people have a tendency to describe more than just moving cardboard shapes. They 
attribute emotions, characters and a story to the scene (Heider and Simmel 1944). 
People inherently perceive these shapes as though they were human beings, complete 
with a full set of motives, emotions, genders, personalities and back stories, just as 
humans would have. This perception is so common that failure to employ this projection 
is usually a symptom of mental illness. Autistic subjects who view this same animation, 
 
Figure 1. 1. Percentage of individuals identifying man made, biological and natural objects 













Man made artifact Biological object Natural object
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will describe it more in terms of geometric objects than motivated characters (Bowler 
and Thommen 2000). This has also been reported in the victims of head trauma 
(Heberlein and Adolphs 2004). Personification of the world can therefore be seen as a 
fundamental feature of human nature. 
The combination of teleological thinking and personification lead us perceive human 
characteristic in otherwise perfectly natural phenomenon. It also leads us to search for 
answers where none may exist i.e. “why do we exist?” and “Who made us?”. Similarly, 
the answer individuals often purport to find to these questions, and themselves also 




A land mark study into social information conformity was conducted by Solomon Asch 
(1951). Participants were misled to belief that they would be taking part in a “vision test” 
and then further deceived by being grouped with five to seven study insiders, playing 
the role of regular participants. Each group was shown two images. One with three lines 
of various lengths, one with a single line (Figure 1.2). The objective given to the naïve 
participant was simple to identify which of the three lines was the same length as the 
single line in the other image.  
The task was designed to be easy. The images were never removed and could be 
referenced at any point in time, so the naïve participant should have been expected to 
return a perfect score. However the key aspect of the experiment was that the naïve 
participant always gave their answer only after the other members of the group had 
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given theirs, one by one. Each subject completed 18 trails, with 12 of these trials being 
‘critical trails’ where all the planted participants answered unanimously and incorrectly. 
The subjects were positioned in the room so they always answered last, having to first 
hear the opinion of 7 of their perceived peers. For the first two trials the planted 
participants always answered correctly to establish some trust with the test subject. The 
third trial was always a critical trial, and the remaining 11 critical trials were chosen at 
random before the trails began for each subject. 
 
Due to the ease of the task, and the fact the reference images were never removed (i.e. 
the evidence was right in front of them) it would be reasonable to assume that no 
participants were convinced to give false answers to conform to the crowd. Surprisingly 
however, the study revealed that 75% of participants conformed to the group consensus 
at least once, with a 32% conformity rate overall.  
Asch (1951) revealed the effect of the desire to conform to the consensus of others, 
even in the unlikely situation that the demonstrable evidence is right in front of us. This 
is likely driven by our desire, as a species, to weigh the judgements of others, and use 
 
Figure 1.2. One of the pairs of cards used in the Asch (1951) conformity experiments. 
Image modified from wikicommons user Nyenyec, original. 
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them as evidence when forming our own opinions. We are a species who learns from 
birth to trust the judgements of others to gain an understanding of our environment 
(Deutsch and Gerard 1955).  
The conformation effect is exaggerated in many ways. The size of the group has been 
shown to have a positive effect on conformation (Asch 1956; Wilder 1977), as has the 
level of consensus within the group (Asch 1956). There is also a positive correlation in 
more cohesive groups (Back 1951; Deutsch and Gerard 1955). The greater the reason 
to trust the group perception over a personal opinion, the greater the rate of conformity.  
Conformation is also greater when decisions are made upon more ambiguous 
information or when a decision has greater importance  (Darley 1966; Baron, Vandello 
et al. 1996), such as a suspect identification from a memory. In these instances 
individuals are more reliant on social information to construct and support their own 
opinion (Baron, Vandello et al. 1996).  
Humans, 75% of who could be persuaded by social consensus to draw a false 
conclusion, despite the accessible and verifiable evidence before their eyes (Asch 
1951), are thus confounded further by community dynamics (Back 1951; Deutsch and 
Gerard 1955; Asch 1956), ambiguity in evidence and the motivation to accept a given 
position to fit in with their social group (Darley 1966; Baron, Vandello et al. 1996).  
1.4.1 Role-playing and belief 
 
Conforming an opinion to align with the group consensus does not necessarily reflect 
the true beliefs of an individual (Deutsch and Gerard 1955). This behaviour may simply 
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be a mechanism for social acceptance. However the mere act of pretending to hold a 
belief, may lead to that belief developing genuinely.  In the case of individuals being 
forced to present a speech they disagree with, the opinions of the speakers moved to 
be more supportive of the speech position, while those who merely listened to the 
speech were less inclined to alter their preconceptions (Janis and King 1954). Similarly, 
habitual smokers were much more likely to agree to the dangers of smoking, only after 
having been required to role-play the part of a non-smoker (Elms 1966).  
When we pretend to hold a position, such as when we conform to a social belief 
pressure, we actually start to believe the part we play. Considering this it is 
subsequently unsurprising to observe the geographic distribution of belief systems. 
Saturation of beliefs leads to conformity to that belief, and that conformity results in 
greater sympathy and acceptance of the belief. This positive feedback explains the 
observable spatial distribution of beliefs.  
 
1.5 Fallibility of personal testimony 
 
Often the most compelling reason for irrational beliefs goes back to direct experience. It 
is difficult to argue against an individual, or group of individuals, who attest to have 
personally witnessed or experienced a supernatural event. While it is not possible to 
completely debunk such claims, it is important to understand the fallibility of both 
memory of events passed, and our cognitive abilities to understand events as they 
happen.  
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1.5.1 Fallibility of experience 
 
For sake of clarity, hearing the voice of the divine will be discussed. It is not only 
common for religious or cult authorities to testify to having held conversations with 
divine beings, but in some belief systems, it is common place for all practitioners such 
as Pentecostal Christians (Samarin 1972). While there are questions about the honesty 
of these claims, there is compelling evidence that many individuals do believe they have 
experienced a genuine divine communication. 
It may be appealing to jump to the conclusion that these people are simply lying, 
deluded, or maybe even suffering from a disease such as schizophrenia. While this may 
be the case, it is not necessarily true. It is also likely for a person who experiences a 
‘divine communication’ to feel reassured in its validity, after sufficiently dismissing the 
possibility that they suffer from such a condition.  
While ‘hearing voices’ is a key symptom of schizophrenia, it is far from a diagnostic 
symptom of the disease. In fact auditory hallucination is a lot more common than people 
realise, and not necessarily a symptom of mental illness at all. Auditory hallucinations 
have been linked to bipolar disorder (Bowden, Calabrese et al. 2003), migraine 
headaches (Ebaugh and Johnson 1933), post-traumatic stress disorder (David, Kutcher 
et al. 1999), social anxiety (Stinson, Valmaggia et al. 2010), multiple personally disorder 
(Ross, Miller et al. 1990; Stinson, Valmaggia et al. 2010), grief and bereavement 
(Grimby 1993), drug abuse (Rosse, Collins et al. 1994), sexual abuse (Honig, Romme 
et al. 1998), solitary confinement (Grassian 1983) and other diseases and mental 
conditions. Far from being a symptom of a deranged mind, there is increasing evidence 
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that practically everybody will experience auditory hallucination at some point in their 
lives. Hearing voices is ‘normal’ (Barrett and Etheridge 1992). Many of these exact 
same conditions can also trigger visual and tactile hallucinations in otherwise very 
normal and sane individuals. 
So how often are people confusing their own hallucination with supernatural events? 
Are even subtle hallucinations experienced being interpreted in a supernatural context, 
and used to reinforce the cognitive bias of the believer. Testimony and experience of 
these events gives believers what they believe to be very strong “evidence” of the 
accuracy of their positions.  Rarely is the possibility of simple hallucination considered, 
despite the frequency these perfectly natural hallucinations occur among perfectly 
normal and sane individuals (Barrett and Etheridge 1992).  
Beyond hallucination it is actually possible to manipulate the function of our brains 
through conscious effort. In an extreme case, such as individuals engaging in 
glossolalia (commonly known as speaking in tongues), we can witness physiological 
changes in brain function through neural imaging.  These individuals show decreased 
activity in the frontal lobe which is consistent with descriptions of a lack of control over 
the phenomenon(Newberg, Wintering et al. 2006). However similar studies have 
demonstrated similar alterations of neural function in the absence of perceived divine 
intervention (Newberg, Alavi et al. 2001). In fact there is evidence that frontal lobe 
activity can be increased through attention focusing and will (Frith, Friston et al. 1991; 
Pardo, Fox et al. 1991). Subsequently it is likely that although these “divine” 
experiences are genuine, and true to report, they can be explained as cognitive 
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alterations due to stimulated changes in brain activity which may be mimicked by the 
ritual of the religion. 
Ultimately it is impossible to ever be sure if an experience is real, no matter how real 
they seem. Experiencing a false event is not a symptom of mental illness, nor is it at all 
anomalous. These experiences are simply common and expected manifestations of the 
fallibilities of human brains. 
1.5.2 Fallibility of memory 
 
People naturally overestimate the accuracy of their memories (Koriat and Bjork 2005). 
We have a tendency to consider our memories as infallible records of events while it 
would be more accurate to consider them as mental reconstructions.  Not only are our 
memories of events weak and patchy, but they are highly susceptible to post event 
information which leads them to change over time, without seeming any less genuine. 
Elizabeth F. Loftus, pioneering scientist in the field of memory research, researches the 
establishment of false memories. Her work has shown that the introduction of 
information after an initial event can overwrite the original memory of the event. This 
leads to what is known as the misinformation effect (Loftus and Palmer 1974; Loftus 
and Hoffman 1989; Saunders and MacLeod 2002). 
Loftus and Palmer (1974) reported that simply substituting the verb used to describe a 
car crash, interviewers could influence the participants descriptions of the speeds 
involved. Participants asked how fast the vehicles ‘smashed’ described faster speeds 
that those asked how fast they ‘collided’, ‘bumped’, ‘contacted’, or ‘hit’ (Table 1.1) 
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There are two ways to interpret this result. Either the participants were uncertain of the 
correct answer, so took information from the question, or the information actually tricks 
the participant’s memories into recalling a more violent collision than really occurred 
(Loftus and Palmer 1974).  
To distinguish between these two possibilities the participants were interviewed again 
after one week. This time they were asked a series of questions, including whether or 
not they had witnessed any broken glass. As there had been none, it was unlikely the 
state of the glass was of interest to the participants when viewing the initial incident, and 
the glass had not been discussed during the first round of interviews. Interestingly the 
participants who had the incident described as a smash were much more likely to report 
having seen broken glass (Table 1.2)   
Table 1.1. Speed estimates of participants given in response to use of the verbs smashed, 
collided, bumped, hit, and contacted, when used to enquire about the participants’ memory 
of the velocity at impact of the vehicles in a recording of a single incident. Taken from Loftus 
and Palmer (1974). 









This demonstrates that their memory of the event had indeed been altered by the post 
event information. These individuals had constructed completely new peripheral 
memories around the original event, to support the apparent intensity of the crash they 
had witnessed. 
If we compound the misinformation effect with the desire for social conformity described 
by Festinger and Carlsmith (1959), we understandably get an even greater result. When 
asked to recall information from memory in the presence of peers, we are much more 
likely to recall information incorrectly than if we first hear our peers recount false 
information (Schneider and Watkins 1996; Reysen 2005). Conformity of recognition was 
also dependent on the strength of the relationship with the individual providing the 
information, along with their confidence in their accuracy (Allan and Gabbert 2008). 
Given this knowledge of the fragility of accurate memories, it is extremely likely that 
events that we remember will contain false details. Despite this, personal testimony and 
anecdotes are highly compelling forms of evidence to most people.  
If an individual experiences a confusing or ambiguous experience, and we then 
introduce social pressure from their respected and trusted peers to ascribe the event to 
Table 1.2. Responses when asked if participants had witnessed broken glass, one week after 
viewing a recording of a single incident, having previously been asked for a estimate of the 
incident. Participants were asked either how fast the vehicles smashed, or how far the 
vehicles hit. The control group had not previously been asked how far they thought the cars 
had been travelling at impact. Taken from Loftus and Palmer (1974). 
 Verb 
 Smashed Hit Control 
Yes 16 7 6 
No 34 43 44 
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a particular irrational explanation, we can almost guarantee the individual will create, 
forget and distort important details from their recollection. It is not that we wish to 
deliberately deceive each other, or that any individual necessarily lacks intelligence, but 
rather because social pressure, ambiguous experience and misinformation can combine 
to create specific memory detail which have little physical correspondence to reality, if 
any at all. 
 
1.6 Need for cognitive closure 
 
Potentially the most fundamental questions humans will ever ask will be in regard to life, 
the universe and everything. However with regard to many of the deepest question 
about the nature of reality, the foremost frontiers of science are only at the early stages 
of generating hypothesis, and may not yet even understand the questions that need to 
be asked (Kennedy and Norman 2005).Yet this has not restricted the number of people 
and organisations proclaiming with absolute certainty, that they already have all the 
answers. When faced with a gap in our knowledge, there is a very pronounced 
tendency to fill the void with unsubstantiated postulations, despite the lack of any 
substantiating evidence for these arguments. People who have a strong desire for 
cognitive closure are those who feel uncomfortable with not knowing the answers to 
questions. These people naturally feel more comfortable with any answer, than no 
answer, and are thus more likely to be attracted to claims of universal certainty. 
In an experiments by Anderson and Barrios (1961), participants were asked to rate the 
suitability of two applicants for a job, based upon ten single word descriptors of the 
individuals. In both cases the descriptors are exactly the same, however for the first 
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applicant they are listed from most positive to least positive, and for the second 
applicant they are listed lease positive to most positive. Despite being informed that the 
descriptors are given in a random order, the participants rated the first applicant more 
highly than the second. This difference is known as the primacy effect. It occurs when 
an individual attempts to render judgements under uncertain conditions due to the 
natural tendency to experience greater influence from the information that comes earlier 
rather than later (Anderson 1965). 
Primacy effects increase in magnitude with an increase in time pressure and decrease 
in magnitude when evaluation apprehension is increased, by making the participants 
liable for their decisions (Kruglanski and Freund 1983). In an instance of both time 
pressure and evaluation apprehension, primacy is again increased. This is due to an 
increased perception of a need for closure. When an individual is seeking an answer 
with a need for closure, any answer is better than confusion and ambiguity. This 
promotes a behaviour know as “seizing and freezing”. Individuals latch on to any 
information that comes along first, then ignore any information that comes along later 
(Kruglanski and Webster 1996). 
An individual’s need for cognitive closure can easily be measured through the use of a 
self evaluating questionnaire. Using this measure Webster and Kruglanski (1994) 
conducted simple primacy experiments, similar to the Asch (1965) experiment. The 
participants were categorised into those with a high need for cognitive closure, and 
those with a low need. The results showed that while the individuals with a low need for 
closure were virtually immune to the primacy effect, the individuals with a high need for 
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closure displayed significant primacy (fig. 1.3). The individuals who most felt a need to 
find an answer, were less likely to consider the information in its entirety, instead they 
were genuinely compelled by the earliest information they received. After freezing upon 
these conclusions they were less influenced by later information. 
 
The need for closure is highly correlated with a propensity for primacy. This means 
whenever a question comes up that begs for an answer, the natural tendency for people 
with a high need for closure is to latch on to whatever answer comes along first, to fill in 
the ambiguity. These individuals then freeze upon this information and are less open to 
considering other information, simply because they have fulfilled their need for closure. 
 
Figure 1.3. Ranking of a mock candidates suitability for a position (max score = 140) based 
upon ten constant descriptions. These were listed either most positive to most negative, or 
most negative to most positive. Participants were grouped as either having a high need for 
closure, or a low need for closure, based upon a personality test. Blue = information given 










High need for closure Low need for closure
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1.6.1 Persistence of discredited information 
 
A related phenomenon to the need for cognitive closure is the persistence of opinions 
formed upon discredited information. 
Anderson, et al. (1980) conducted an experiment in which participants were given a 
fictitious report, suggesting either a positive or a negative relationship between risk 
taking by fire fighters, and the success of those fire fighters. These participants were 
then interviewed on their beliefs regarding the topic. Having had no prejudice on the 
topic, it was unsurprising that most individuals were highly supportive of whatever report 
they had read. Comparably a control group was interviewed who read neither report, 
and subsequently demonstrated less significantly favouritism for either option (Figure 
1.4).
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At this time the researchers debriefed the participants. They revealed the fictitious 
nature of reports, and effectively discredited all the information the participants has 
drawn their conclusions from. However, when re-interviewed, the participants largely 
retained their original position. This was true for both the individuals conditioned to 
believe in a positive risk relationship, and a negative risk relationship (Figure 1.4). This 
study reveals that even when initially based on weak data, social theories can survive 
the total discrediting of that initial evidential base (Anderson, Lepper et al. 1980). 
1.7 Confirmation bias 
 
Confirmation bias describes the nature of people to seek information which conforms to 
their preconceptions. This was demonstrated by in a study conducted on well-educated 
undergraduate students (Wason 1960). The students were given a three number series 
 
Figure 1.4 Mean estimates of the relationship between risk preference and fire-fighter 
success (max =3, min =-3)  by participants conditioned towards favouring either a positive or 
negative relationship via a fictitious report, and after a debriefing in which the participants 
were informed the report was completely fabricated.  The control group was not given a 
report before giving their estimate of the relationship. Blue = conditioned towards a positive 
relationship, Red = conditioned towards a negative relationship, White = control. Taken from 























which conformed to a simple rule known only to the examiner. The participants aim was 
to discover this rule by writing down another three number sequence, as well as their 
justification for having chosen those numbers. The only feedback given by the examiner 
to the subjects was if their number sequence conformed to the same rule as the first 
sequence. The subjects were asked to use as few sequences as possible to discern the 
rule. When the subjects were confident of the rule they was told this to the examiner. If 
the answer was incorrect the test continued.  
The number sequence chosen was “2, 4, and 6”. This sequence conforms to several 
immediately obvious patterns. These were reflected in the most commonly returned 
incorrect rules; that the  numbers were increasing in intervals of two, that they increased 
in multiples of the first number, that they were consecutive even numbers, or that they 
had an arithmetic progression. The true rule for the sequence was simply that the 
numbers needed to proceed in magnitude.   
Only six of the 31 subjects discerned the correct rule without having first made an error. 
These subjects gave a non-conforming number sequence 20% of the time, compared to 
the other subjects who only gave one 4% of the time. This experiment demonstrates 
that even well-educated individuals instinctively only seek information to confirm their 
preconceptions, rather than to refute them.  
“In a similar experiment conducted by Kunda, Fong, et al. (1993) found that individuals 
asked if they are happy with their social life will report a greater satisfaction than those 
asked if they are unhappy with their social life. An explanation in the difference in 
reported satisfaction with one’s social life comes from the manner in which we 
 26 
determine the answer such to a question, which is to check for internal consistency. If 
asked if they are happy with their social life, and they can recall a time when this was 
true, then they will answer in the affirmative. Similarly, if asked if they are unhappy, and 
they can recall a time when their social life was disappointing, then they will confirm 
their unhappiness with their social life.” 
Confirmation bias manifests itself in several distinct ways which need to be carefully 
considered and addressed when in the pursuit of knowledge.  
1.7.1 Biased Acquisition of information 
 
People tend to seek information that supports their preconceptions, and avoid 
information which conflicts with it (Pyszczynski, Greenberg et al. 1985). When we go 
looking for a particular response, we are much more likely to find it. It is difficult to avoid 
however, when it is considered that evidence can only ever be treated in a totally 
unbiased way if an individual has no personal interest in it (Nickerson 1998). 
When given a bogus social sensitivity test, participants were manipulated to return 
either a poor or a high result, and were then informed the other participants had either 
performed well, or poorly overall. When given the opportunity to view the test of other 
participants, the high scoring, individuals, complacent in their self-worth, were largely 
uninterested. Meanwhile the low scoring individuals asked to see the results of their 
peer’s tests, but much more regularly when they believed that others had also 
performed badly (Pyszczynski, Greenberg et al. 1985). This demonstrates that we 
instinctively do not wish to seek out information that is unfavourable to us. 
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1.7.2 Biased Interpretation of information 
 
People interpret information in a manner most flattering to their preconceptions, and are 
more likely to discredit information unfavourable to their preconceptions (Koriat, 
Lichtenstein et al. 1980). 
In one experiment, individuals supporting and opposing capital punishment were given 
two fictitious studies, one confirming their existing prejudices, the other challenging it. 
Both proponents and opponents of capital punishment more favourably rated the results 
of the studies that confirmed their existing position. Despite being exposed to an 
identical body of information, the contending factions managed to increase their 
polarization (Lord, Ross et al. 1979).  
Functional MRI has been employed to study the brains of strong political party 
supporters, when exposed to information both in support of and opposed to their 
preferred politician. The results from this study demonstrated that motivated reasoning 
was qualitatively distinct, from reasoning when people did not have a strong emotional 
stake in the conclusions reached (Westen, Blagov et al. 2006).  
Wason (1960) demonstrated that those individuals most willing to be wrong, were most 
likely to find out what is right. Yet a person’s intrinsic reasoning leads them to want to 
accept their preconception (Westen, Blagov et al. 2006). The reason for this desire is 
what is known as cognitive dissonance. 
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1.8 Cognitive Dissonance 
 
In 1957 Leon Fetsinger published a book which recorded his experiences while living 
with a doomsday cult. When Prophesies Fail chronicled the cult in the time preceding 
their prophesied alien apocalypse, as well as during the time when cult members had to 
deal with the reality that the prophecies would not come to pass. Fetsinger made two 
predictions about the cult. One, the world would not end, and two, the cult members 
who were the highest invested in the prophecies would be the least likely to abandon 
the idea after it failed to eventuate.  
Fetsinger was correct on both predictions. He termed his explanation of the tenacity in 
devotion of the most heavily invested cult members, after the failed prophecies, as 
cognitive dissonance.  
Cognitive dissonance occurs when an individual holds two or more conflicting thoughts 
simultaneously. This puts them in an uncomfortable position and motivates them to 
reduce these instances of dissonance. This is achieved by modifying or discrediting 
thoughts, to create a singular consistent belief system (Festinger 1957). In its simplest 
terms, cognitive dissonance is the mind protecting its reputation from itself (Festinger 
and Carlsmith 1959). 
One of the greatest predictive powers of cognitive dissonance is that individuals will 
seek to reduce dissonance in the manner which most favours their ego.  In the simplest 
case this may be the dissonance between the thoughts: “this was my fault” or “this was 
not my fault”. With the exception of particularly non-ambiguous conditions, it is likely an 
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individual will seek to lay blame somewhere other than themselves. Even when this 
exercise fails, the desire still exists. This is because the mind also seeks to reduce the 
dissonance between how we should act, and how we have acted; the dissonance 
between how we like to think of ourselves (smart, kind, sensible, etc.) and how our 
actions reflect on us (foolish). In the case of the doomsday cult, heavily invested 
members ignored the possibility that they had prepared for and preached about a false 
prophecy, because this conflicted with the idea that they were intelligent rational people 
(Fetsinger, 1957).  
Outside of doomsday cults cognitive dissonance is very common. An individual who 
smokes is constantly exposed to information on the health risks or doing so, such as 
lung cancer. Subsequently, due to their inability to break with the habit, they may 
genuinely convince themselves that the health risks are lower than they are in reality 
(Festinger 1957; Feather 1962). Moreover, cognitive dissonance is an important 
obstacle in both the effective communication of, and the motivation to resolve issues 
surrounding climate change (Stoll-Kleemann, O’Riordan et al. 2001). Cognitive 
dissonance allows individuals some consistency between their actions and their beliefs, 
while also relieving their concerns.  
Cognitive dissonance predicts that the more heavily invested in a belief a person is, the 
less likely they are to accept the foolishness of this belief. This can be thought of as a 
kind of “catch-22”, where attempting to educate someone with relevant and significant 
evidence, ultimately leads only to them reaffirming their original position more 
adamantly.  
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1.8.1 Insufficient justification effect 
 
In a landmark study Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) asked participants to perform a task 
designed to be extremely tedious and unenjoyable. This went on for a half hour, only to 
be followed by an equally tedious and unenjoyable task for the next half hour. In a small 
mercy, the tasks were ended at this time and the participants were given a survey. This 
contained the questions; “how enjoyable was the task?” and “what is your desire to 
participate in a similar experiment”. Unsurprisingly the participants responded negatively 
to the enjoyability of the test, and were far from enthusiastic about future participation. 
(Figure 1.5). These participants were the control group in the experiment.  
Two further groups of participants were given the exact same tasks to complete. 
However at the completion of their tasks and prior to the survey, each of these 
participants were asked if they would mind helping the examiner by introducing the 
experiment to the next participant, who was in the waiting room. These participants 
were told that the person who usually performs this task was preoccupied today and it 
would be of great service to the examiners. The participants were asked to say “It was 
very enjoyable, I had a lot of fun, I enjoyed myself, it was very interesting, it was 
intriguing, and it was exciting”. In other words, the participants were asked to lie. In 
compensation for this service the participants would receive $20 if they were in the first 
group, but only $1 in the second group (adjusted for inflation this equates to roughly 
$160USD for group one, and $8UDS for group two, as of 2012). After lying to the ‘next 
participant’, who was in fact merely an actor, these participants were given the same 
survey as the group who was not asked to lie. The results from these surveys are 
summarised in Figure 1.5. 
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The study found that those individuals who were poorly compensated for their 
deception, reported the greatest enjoyment of the task, while those who lied but were 
well compensated, were much more similar in their responses to the control group. This 
study demonstrated that when given insufficient justification to tell a lie cognitive 
dissonance led the participants to genuinely convince themselves that what they were 
saying was true. The well compensated group overcame their guilt about deceiving the 
‘next participant’, because the reward was worth it, and thus experienced no 
dissonance. However the poorly compensated group could only overcome their guilt by 
convincing themselves they were not being deceitful.  
 
Figure 1.5. Participants rating of 1. their enjoyment and. 2. their willingness to participate in 
similar studies (max=5, min=-5) of a deliberately tedious and repetitive task, after being 
asked to endorse the task to another individual. Participants were remunerated for this 
endorsement with either $1 or $20. The control group were not asked to endorse the task. 
Blue = control, red = participants remunerated with $1, green= participants remunerated with 











1.9 Logical Fallacy 
 
Only a very small proportion of logical fallacies are discussed here. More thorough 
collections may contain over 100 separate fallacies (Wikipedia contributors 2012). The 
large number of distinct fallacies is evidence that humans can struggle forming logical 
arguments. The small selection discussed here is sufficient to illustrate the abundance 
of fallacies in use within society. It is important to understand that individuals who 
commit these fallacies are not necessarily intentionally attempting to deceive others.  It 
is much more likely that these arguments are genuinely sound and compelling evidence 
in the minds of the individuals using them. 
1.9.1. Strawman argument 
 
Strawman arguments are so called because an offender first constructs their own 
version of their opponent’s argument, and then attacks that idea, rather than the actual 
position of their opponent. The 'strawman' is usually an oversimplification or 
misrepresentation of the opponent’s position, which serves to exaggerate that position 
to absurdity. Strawman arguments are very common, and have even established 
themselves as fundamental in many anti-science debates such as anti-evolution.   
"Darwin said ... you have got to prove transitional forms, one animal transitioning 
into another. And all through the fossil record and life; we don't find one of these, 
a Crocoduck!"– Kirk Cameron(2008) 
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1.9.2. False dichotomy 
 
A false dichotomy is a logical fallacy in which the offender limits the possible 
explanations to two, for any given situation. This fallacy is usually committed through 
accidental omission of additional options, rather than by deliberate deception. The two 
options considered can represent the extreme points of a spectrum of possibilities, or 
simple be presented as mutually exclusive, collectively exhaustive positions.  
This fallacy leads people to believe that they can secure their positions by discrediting 
opposing positions to their own. The debate over the role of CO2 in climate change is 
often complicated by a false dichotomy. Many people are convinced by arguments, that 
because CO2 is a necessary part of the “carbon cycle”, it is not possible that it is also a 
greenhouse pollutant. The inability to consider a spectrum of effects reflects individual’s 
instinctive “black and white thinking”, which leads them to make false dichotomy 
fallacies. 
“Grade school students understand that CO2 is plant food and so anything but 
"climate pollution" as former Vice President Al Gore wrongly labels it.” Fone 
(2013) 
1.9.3. Argument from ignorance 
 
The argument from ignorance fallacy states that something is true because we can't 
prove that it is false. This argument is often called the ‘god of the gaps’ argument, as 
religious individuals often rationalise their belief that unless science knows everything, 
there is still a place for a supernatural deity. UFO proponents are probably the most 
frequent abusers of this logic. Almost all UFO eyewitness evidence is ultimately an 
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argument that lights or objects sighted in the sky are unknown, and therefore they are 
alien spacecraft (Tyson 2011).  
The lack of evidence to discredit an argument is often seen as compelling evidence in 
support of that argument. Unfortunately this leads to persistent irrational position which 
people are able to defend, simply because the idea cannot be disproven. 
To demonstrate the absurdity of an argument from ignorance Bertrand Russell (1952) 
proposed the following analogy: 
“If I were to suggest that between the Earth and Mars there is a china teapot 
revolving about the sun in an elliptical orbit, nobody would be able to disprove my 
assertion provided I were careful to add that the teapot is too small to be 
revealed even by our most powerful telescopes. But if I were to go on to say that, 
since my assertion cannot be disproved, it is intolerable presumption on the part 
of human reason to doubt it, I should rightly be thought to be talking nonsense.” 
1.9.4. Appeal to the masses 
 
An appeal to the masses states that the more people who share a position, the greater 
the evidence for that position’s accuracy. This reasoning implies that a position can be 
validated simply by believing it (Walton 1980). This fallacy is usually employed when a 
majority holds a single position (e.g. "nine out of ten dentists”). Without offering any 
evidence to the accuracy of a position, the saturation of the belief is meaningless. It is 
possible for the majority of people to be wrong.  
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1.9.5. Appeal to authority 
 
An appeal to authority fallacy is committed when a positions validity is defended with the 
opinion of an authority. This fallacy is very common among children, who happily accept 
the statements of their parents as unquestionable truth, but is just as common among 
adults. An argument from a true authority is often a valid argument, when the authority 
is a proven and respected expert in the field in question. For example, Stephen 
Hawking’s opinions of black holes are valid evidence in a general discussion on black 
holes. However the opinion of Stephen Hawking is never more important than the 
evidence supporting his arguments, and his establishment as an authority is firmly 
dependant on his peer-reviewed publications. Reasoning from authority becomes 
illogical when the authority does not meet the criteria as expert (RationalWiki 
Contributors 2013), or when the opinion of an expected authority in a field has no 
supporting evidence, or is at odd with the available evidence (Cohen 1994).  
Several online lists of authorities have been created in support of irrational positions 
such as vaccine dangers, A.I.D.S denialism (Alive and Well 2007), climate change 
denial (Global Warming Petition Project 2013) and evolution opposition (Answers in 
Genesis 2012). All these lists contain genuine authorities; however reasoning based 
upon this evidence remains illogical as the opinions of these experts are at odds with 
the majority of experts in their fields, and with the available evidence (NCSE 2013).  
1.9.6. Appeal to antiquity 
 
An appeal to antiquity states that an idea is valid because it has existed for a long time. 
This reasoning appeals to us, as we believe a bad idea would more likely fall out of 
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favour with time, and eventually be abandoned. Subsequently traditions that have 
persisted for longer should be more sound. Despite this appeal to our common sense, 
the age of a belief offers no evidence or strength of its validity (Bennett 2013).  
1.9.7. Ad Hominem attack 
 
An ad hominem argument consists of making an attack against the person making an 
argument instead of addressing the substance of their argument (Walton 1998). 
Statements which proclaim that Joseph Stalin, Pol Pot and/or Mao Zedong were 
atheists, have no bearing on the existence of a deity. No matter how evil the proponents 
of a position are, they cannot affect the evidence for or against that position. 
Ad hominem should not be confused with an insult. Insults seeks to belittle an opponent 
but are not presented as evidence. However this distinction can be blurry, as the two 
concepts are not mutually exclusive. 
1.9.8. Summary 
 
All of these logical fallacies share a common thread. They do not argue about the 
evidence for the positions they are employed to support.  
Logical fallacies are understandable in the light of cognitive dissidence. When we 
understand that the mind is constantly trying to defend its ego to itself, we can start to 
appreciate why these poor arguments make sense to us. In the process of reducing 
dissonance, we need to deceive ourselves by manipulating and ignoring evidence. We 
can achieve this by employing illogical arguments to distort the information to support 
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our desired position. A by-product of using illogical arguments to convince ourselves, is 
a susceptibility to the illogical arguments of others. 
Cognitive dissonance instils us with the narcissistic idea that what we believe is true and 
correct. Subsequently, those who hold different opinions to us are obviously wrong and 
foolish. Misinterpreting an opposing position to absurdity (strawmanning) aligns it with 
our presumptions that their position is foolish. Due to conformational bias, we only 
naturally attempt to prove our original position. This leads us to conclude that by 
disproving opposing positions we can validate our beliefs, leading us to a false 
dichotomy fallacy. Similarly, if an opposing position is unable to fully discredit our 
preconceptions, we can simply maintain them with an argument from ignorance.  
Appeals to the masses, to authority and from antiquity give us confidence in our position 
because of our trust of other people’s opinions.  If we can convince ourselves that the 
opinions of others who share our position are genuine and trustable, then we strengthen 
our resolve in our own position, despite offering no evidence to the validity of these 
positions. This reasoning is a direct result of group influence described by Asch (1951). 
As we learn to trust the opinion of others to determine what we believe, it is only natural 
that we then defend those beliefs with the same evidence. 
An adhominem fallacy can be thought of as a kind of reverse appeal to authority. Just 
as it is naturally reassuring to have our own beliefs aligned with experts, it is appealing 
to have our opponent beliefs aligned with foolish, or bad people. Linking our opponent’s 
position with the regimes of Nazi Germany is appealing as it conforms with our 





Humans are extremely predisposed toward establishing irrational beliefs.  We have 
evolved language, which has enabled us to learn with direct experience, but has left us 
susceptible to both intentional deception, and unintentional misinforming. Our ability to 
exploit natural patterns for our benefit has left us with the ability to find meaning within 
random noise, and we are predisposed to attribute these perceived phenomenon to 
intentional, anthropomorphic agencies. As social animals we rely on the opinions of 
other to validate our own beliefs. Subsequently any community-held belief will be 
reaffirmed in all the members. Even if an individual questions a belief, simply by role-
playing for social acceptance, they become more sympathetic to the idea. This is 
especially true for beliefs with ambiguous evidence. All of these factors lead to the 
inception of belief systems, from simple superstitions to complex religions. 
Once a belief is established, our cognitive nature will defend its persistence even in the 
face of contradictory information. An individual who has their belief challenged is likely 
to defend the position internally, due to cognitive dissonance. This will lead the 
individual to use information selection, interpretation biases and logical fallacies to 
reaffirm the strength of their position. Individuals will also be susceptible to the illogical 
reasoning of others, due to the need for illogical reasoning to fulfil our own self-
deception. 
It is important to recognise two things from this chapter. Firstly, irrational belief is not the 
product of ignorance, but the product of being human. Nor are people necessarily being 
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intentionally dishonest when they propagating false or misleading information. Secondly 
it is not appropriate to dismiss illogical arguments or other poor forms of evidence, as 
these arguments are often compelling to a vast number of people. It is also not sufficient 
to simply correct the information of a person who holds an irrational belief, nor is it 
enough to give a person the information to make a decision based on the evidence 
alone.  
It is clear, with an understanding of the cognitive predisposition towards irrationality, that 
scientific principles of scepticism, falsifiability, peer review and rigorous testing of 
evidence, are required to counteract these factors, if we wish to pursuit truth with 
intellectual integrity. We can only be empowered to avoid our natural bias and 





Misinformation is not only very prevalent in modern society, but increasingly easy to 
access, as the global population moves towards greater internet saturation (Khan, 
Miankhel et al. 2012). Misinformation can take the form of simple factual fallacies such 
as ‘elephants are the only mammals with four knees’ (QI 2013) or ‘bats always turn left 
when they exit a cave (Backyard Animal Habitats 2011). Yet it may be as complex as 
fully established global conspiracy theories, such as predictions of the establishment of 
a totalitarian government, known as the “New World Order” (Scudamore 2012); or even 
that shape-shifting reptilian aliens have already taken control of our world by gaining 
political power in human form, with the intention of manipulating society to their will (Icke 
1999).  
All people have the task of trying to make informed decisions and rationalise their 
beliefs from a confusing mix of pseudoscience, opinions and misinformation they are 
regularly exposed to. Consequently it is unsurprising that so many individuals hold non-
scientific positions, and even propagate and defend these positions, along with the 
misinformation supporting them. While it may not be possible to ever remedy this 
network of misinformation, it is important to understand how it operates, and how it is 
changing as the information landscape evolves. With this knowledge and an 
understanding of the innate irrationality of human nature, the obstacles to efficient 
science communication and education become much clearer.  
 41 
This chapter will occasionally use examples of specific scientific misinformation for 
demonstration purposes; however the focus of discussion is the prevalence, sources, 
and appeal of this information in general. 
 
2.1 Barriers to accessing ‘scientific’ information 
In academic circles it can be easy to dismiss the effect of misinformation, in the 
knowledge that scientific peer-reviewed literature is more readily available than ever 
before, via online article databases. Yet this information is largely unattainable to 
individuals not affiliated with universities or organisations with subscriptions to this 
material (Anderson 2004; Suber 2010). 
Due to the desire of many governments to increase civic science literacy, there has 
been a push to increase the amount of scientific literature available free of subscription 
fees, through open access (Anderson 2004; Björk, Welling et al. 2010; Suber 2010). 
This access removes the price barrier to public access of scientific literature; however 
there are still several issues with lay people accessing the information. 
From the perspective of an individual not formally trained in science, the streamlined 
objectiveness of the science literature can make it nearly incomprehensible (Favell, 
Jacobson et al. 2005). Not only is the work difficult to understand, but the credibility of a 
piece of scientific information can be difficult for an individual to ascertain, if they are not 
able to comprehend factors such as the terminology used, the description of the 
methodology or the use of citations of other papers (Zuccala 2009). Many New 
Zealanders judge research as irrelevant or unconvincing if they do not understand the 
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research methods and/or the meaning of evidence is not immediately obvious to them 
(Hipkins, Stockwell et al. 2002; Christensen 2011).  
This makes less formal information a more attractive option to a many people who may 
also overestimate the credibility of these sources. While individuals with higher science 
education may instinctively match the methods of an experiment with the conclusions 
drawn by the study, people without this experience reason more heavily on personal 
experience (Ratcliffe 1999). Without a sound understanding of the links between 
scientific theory and investigative methods, it is difficult for the non-scientist to 
understand the implications of scientific research, leading them to be more likely to 
dismiss it (Hipkins, Stockwell et al. 2002). 
For this reason very little public exposure to science literature comes directly from 
scientific journals. More commonly this information is accessed through second hand 
reporting on the studies, by mass media. 
 
2.2 Accuracy of traditional media 
When formal education in science ends, media become the most available and 
sometimes the only source for the public to gain information about scientific discoveries, 
controversies, events, and the work of scientists (Nisbet, Scheufele et al. 2002). 
Science and scientists are portrayed in mass media daily. As a result many individuals 
receive much of their knowledge about science and scientists from the mass media they 
are exposed to (Gerbner, Gross et al. 1981). Despite this the individuals responsible for 
the portrayal of science in the media are often as uninformed about science and its 
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processes as the general public (Lipps 1999; Power 2013). Newspapers with dedicated 
science sections are on the decline (Morrison 2013) and screen writers who wish to do 
intelligent stories about science, often do not have the basic knowledge to do so (Lipps 
1999).  
The journalistic ideal of ‘balanced’ reporting (giving roughly equal coverage to both 
sides in a dispute) is both useful and problematic for science. It allows a scientist a fair 
hearing in debate, however it also give the impression that both positions carry equal 
authority, even when expert opinion is at a consensus (Boykoff 2008). News media 
utilise personalisation, dramatisation and sensationalisation to ‘sell’ their articles, which 
also distorts the accuracy of science reporting (Boykoff and Boykoff 2007). In one 
survey, more than 75% of scientists believed that the media, when covering science, 
were more interested in sensationalism than truth; that media coverage concentrates 
too much on trendy discoveries rather than basic research and development; and that 
the media exaggerated risks, unduly alarming the public  (Hartz and Chappell 1997). 
In the debate on climate change, only 32% of American climate scientists rated network 
television news as being reliable, 26% rated cable news as reliable, 36% local 
newspapers as reliable, and the US national press was rated as reliable by 67%. Less 
than 1% of climate experts rated the film “The Day After Tomorrow” as very reliable 
(Lichter 2008). While this study shows that climate scientists do not feel that traditional 
media is accurately portraying their field, other studies have not been as damning. 
Boykoff (2007) reviewed newspaper articles regarding climate change published 
between 2003 and 2006 in top tier newspapers from both the UK and the US. Upon 
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review of 1607 articles it was concluded that neither countries newspaper coverage of 
the role of anthropogenic processes significantly varied from the scientific consensus, 
with the exception of the 2003-2004 articles published in the US. This shows that 
newspaper coverage is, at least, becoming more aligned with the scientific consensus.  
 
2.2.1 Pseudoscientific television 
Potentially the most education-focused channels currently broadcast in New Zealand 
are the Discovery, National Geographic, History and Animal Planet channels. This 
programming has regularly included a mix of popular interest series, of little educational 
value such as Deadliest Catch, Pawn Star and American Chopper. However these 
channels also broadcast programmes, which are entirely pseudoscientific. The number 
of pseudoscientific programmes being broadcast on these channels has increased 
significantly over the past decade (Figure 2.1), after the establishment of the 
pseudoscience reality show investigation format (Hawks 2011).  
Pseudoscience programmes are being presented as science, and are largely 
indistinguishable from science by lay people. Tsai et. al. (2012) found that exposure to 
pseudoscientific programming accounted for 18.4% of the variance in pseudoscientific 
belief in the Filipino population studied. This made it the single most crucial variable 




2.3 A changing information landscape 
New Zealanders have greater access to high-speed internet than ever before. As on 
June 2011 the number of broadband subscriptions in New Zealand was 1,492,500. This 
was an increase of 32% from June 2009. Among the younger generation, internet 
access is even higher (Bascand 2011). As access to the internet continues to become 
 
Figure 2.1. Year of broadcast of pseudoscientific programming series. Red=History Channel, 
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more readily available, the information landscape is changing towards a greater reliance 
on this new media.  In 2011 the internet was rated as a more important source of 
information than television , newspapers, radio, libraries and even interpersonal sources 
such as family and friends  (Figure 2.2) with 53% of New Zealand internet users 
accessing news information from the internet on a daily basis and 93% doing so at least 
occasionally (Smith, Gibson et al. 2011).  
 
This significant change in the information landscape, makes it important to consider the 
implications of this new information access. 
2.3.1 Implication to information access 
 
It is commonly assumed that greater science literacy would ensure that the public 
makes judgments more in line with those of scientists or experts (Nisbet, Scheufele et 
al. 2002). This belief is supported by a framework commonly used in the perception of 
risk, which assumes that individual response to risk is conditioned by level of knowledge 
(Wildavsky and Dake 1990). The greater an individual’s knowledge of a subject, the 
more accurately they can assess the risks involved. Unsurprisingly the most 
 
Figure 2.2. Importance of various media types to New Zealanders, when accessing 
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scientifically literate individuals hold fewer reservations about the impact of science and 
technology on life and a greater belief in the promise of science and technology to 
improve life (Miller and Kimmel 2001). 
This information presents a clear concern for an information landscape so saturated 
with non-expert driven information dissemination.  Anyone can establish a site on the 
internet.  If not their own site, then they may participate in a forum, contribute to a blog, 
or propagate misinformation in any number of readily accessible means (Lipps 1999). 
People who lack scientific literacy not only interpret information incorrectly, but are also 
able to pass their own misunderstanding to others. Due to their inexperience with 
science these individuals are more likely to perceive scientific concepts as being 
potentially dangerous (Miller and Kimmel 2001; Nisbet, Scheufele et al. 2002). With the 
blind leading the blind, a current internet user is unlikely to increase their scientific 
literacy, simply because it is cluttered with so many sites and individuals propagating 
and receiving misinformation (Lipps 1999). 
While scientists publish in their academic journals, and participate in conferences, 
individuals who are not a part of these specific academic circles are left vulnerable to 
the influences of misinformation (Favell, Jacobson et al. 2005).  
 
2.4 Accuracy of online information 
 
The internet facilitates discussion and hosts information in far too many topics to be 
discussed meaningfully in this thesis. For this reason selected healthcare information 
accuracy will be discussed to represent the wider state of internet information credibility. 
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Healthcare is selected both due to its popularity, with 80% of internet users seeking 
health information at some point in time (Fox 2011), and for the importance that this 
information is accurate. 
The internet facilitates health communication and allows users to engage and educate 
others by sharing their medical histories, treatment successes and failures. In this 
environment patients become “active contributors” in their own care, and are 
subsequently empowered. This has led to the emergence of online communities and 
social networking, defined by a new paradigm of healthcare, where power has shifted 
from doctors to patients, the legitimacy of science is questioned, and expertise is 
redefined  (Kata 2012). Patient-driven medical information may be largely harmless, or 
even beneficial in many cases, but arouses significant concern when applied to already 
contentious issues, such as vaccination.  
In an experiment into the accuracy of online information regarding vaccination, high 
school students were used to represent a ‘naïve’ audience. A group of 34 students used 
Google to conduct and internet search of the terms “vaccine safety” and “vaccine 
danger”. Of the 43 students 59% thought that the internet sites were accurate on the 
whole, even though 55% of the pages were deemed generally inaccurate by the 
researchers. The students were then asked to produce verifiable facts on vaccines. Of 
the 41 facts reported by the students only 17 (41%) were correct. This study 
demonstrates that lay people who gain information about contentious medical topics 
from the internet may get predominantly incorrect information (Kortum, Edwards et al. 
2008). The quantity of inaccurate vaccination information available online likely 
contributes to the finding of Jones, Omer et al. (2012), that parents who sought vaccine 
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information on the internet were more likely to have lower perceptions of vaccine safety, 
vaccine effectiveness, disease susceptibility and were more likely to have an 
unvaccinated child without a medical reason to resist vaccination. 
Vaccination safety continues to be hotly debated (Freed, Clark et al. 2010), however 
breast cancer treatment is a relatively non-contentious issue. Esquivel, Meric-Bernstam, 
et. al. (2006) conducted a study into the accuracy of online information regarding breast 
cancer treatment. Of the 4600 instances of information being posted to a forum, only 10 
(0.22%) were found to be either false, or misleading. Seven of these instances were 
identified by other participants within the community and was rectified, within an 
average of one and a half hours (Esquivel, Meric-Bernstam et al. 2006). This 




Wikipedia is not a formally peer-reviewed scholarly source of information. Some articles 
are poorly written, poorly researched, lack citations  and are subject to deliberate abuse 
(Denning, Horning et al. 2005; Nielsen 2007). Despite this, Wikipedia has established 
itself as one of the favourite research tools available today (Kittur, Suh et al. 2008; Head 
and Eisenberg 2010; Baker 2012). For this reason it is important to consider the 
accuracy of information on Wikipedia, and assess the strengths and weakness of this 
anonymous, self-moderating model of information sharing. 
The most cited and best known study into the accuracy of Wikipedia was conducted by 
Giles (2005). Fifty corresponding articles were chosen from a broad range of scientific 
subjects, from both the Wikipedia website, and the online Encyclopaedia Britannica. 
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These were sent to the respective experts in the fields to which they related, and peer 
reviewed to ascertain accuracy. Within the 42 useable reports, both the Wikipedia and 
Encyclopedia Britannica articles contained four serious errors each. A higher number of 
minor errors were reported, such as factual errors, omissions and misleading 
statements: with 162 in the Wikipedia articles and 123 in the Encyclopedia Britannica 
articles. This study was conducted when Wikipedia was around 1/5th the size it is today 
(Size of Wikipedia 2012), so the accuracy of this study is questionable. The use of 
proper scientific citations in Wikipedia articles is also increasing, with good agreement 
with the citation pattern seen in the scientific literature, though with a slight tendency to 
cite articles from high impact journals (Nielsen 2007).  
While the accuracy of Wikipedia is comparable to existing encyclopaedias overall  
(Giles 2005), particularly controversial topics may be at heightened risk of abuse (List of 
controversial issues 2012). These issues experience a much higher than average 
number of edits by competing groups or individuals, who hold conflicting opinions. A 
notable case involved respected British climatologist, and mass Wikipedia contributor 
William Connolley (Wikipedia contributors 2005). Connolley found himself engaged in 
an editing dispute with another contributor. Despite Connolley citing established journals 
for specific facts and his opponent citing sources such as author Michael Crichton and a 
conspiracy website, both individuals were ultimately penalized by Wikipedia 
administrators by having their editing abilities limited (Forte and Bruckman 2008). While 
this was a single case, the existence of many highly reedited web-pages on Wikipedia 
illustrates continuing opposed views on some topics. There remains reason for concern 
for the accuracy of information in an open contribution encyclopedia model. 
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2.5 Online social networks 
 
The popularity of online social networks is obtained from the convenience, as well as 
efficiency of information dissemination and sharing, based on the trust relationships built 
among their users. Unfortunately, such trust relationships on social networks can 
possibly be exploited for distributing misinformation or rumors  (Nguyen, Nguyen et al. 
2012; Nguyen, Yan et al. 2012). This was well demonstrated in 2009, when the 
widespread panic ensued, because of misinformed tweets and retweets about swine flu 
(Morozov 2009).  
Salathé and Khandelwal (2011) conducted a study on almost 40,000 online social 
media users, into their interaction and opinions regarding a novel vaccine. They found 
that there was greater flow of information between users who shared the same 
sentiments, than those who held different sentiments. They also found that the 
communities polarised into being dominated by either positive or negative sentiments. 
With clustering of likeminded users, online social networks are efficiently able to spread 
misinformation virally, but dissemination of accurate and reliable information across all 
groups is difficult (Nguyen, Yan et al. 2012).  
The roles of online social media as a mechanism for the viral spread of misinformation 
require significant focus in the future. Presently the means to measure the effects  of 
social media information dissemination are being developed (Nguyen, Nguyen et al. 
2012; Nguyen, Yan et al. 2012), however the means to adequately responded to the 
viral spread of misinformation does not exist (Salathé and Khandelwal 2011). 
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2.6 Persuasive arguments 
 
The persuasiveness of an argument is determined not only by the strength of the 
argument, but also by the implications of the argument, if it were true (Fishbein and 
Ajzen 1975; Areni and Lutz 1988). People find it more difficult to evaluate arguments 
supporting a probability claim than to evaluate arguments supporting a desirability claim 
(Areni and Lutz 1988). Understanding this limit to our reasoning ability sheds some light 
onto the pervasiveness of arguments on the health dangers of common preventative 
medicines, such as the debate on water fluoridation. While the most common 
arguments into the dangers of water fluoridation rely heavily upon a poor understanding 
of chemistry, this is not immediately obvious to the lay consumer of this information 
(Armfield 2007; Griffin, Shickle et al. 2008). In this case the pervasiveness of the 
arguments depends more highly on the implications of each position. In one case an 
argument is being made for improved dental hygiene, on the other hand are arguments 
into the systematic poisoning of populations, destruction of the environment, 
infringement of civil liberties (Bryson 2004), and even, in some cases, mind control 
conspiracies (Montgomery 2000). While the evidence for these arguments may be 
weak, they are made persuasive due the significance if they were to be true.  
A similar effect occurs when individuals search for information and are met with the 
claims of both scientific and pseudoscientific information. For example, when seeking 
information on medical treatments, claims of quick, effortless, and easy to obtain 
alternative treatments are much more appealing than their scientifically based 
counterparts  (Dwyer 1993; Favell, Jacobson et al. 2005). This is because of the 
conservative nature of scientific reporting, which heavily discourages potentially 
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unfounded claims from being made. The attractiveness of alternative treatments is not 
due to the strength of the arguments for their effectiveness, but merely due to the 
possibility of their claims they make being accurate.  
2.6.1 Anecdotal evidence 
 
Anecdotal evidence is widely used as supporting evidence in claims of the supernatural, 
pseudoscience and in advertising. Anecdotal evidence exploits the innate cognitive 
process of  humans to assess the accuracy of a statement by checking it against an 
personal example (Tversky and Kahneman 1973). Conversely statistical information can 
lack impact because of its abstract nature (Borgida and Nisbett 2006). In a study into 
the comprehension of media reporting of contemporary science issues, only secondary 
school students invoked reasoning from personal experience to interpreted the reports, 
when compared to more experienced tertiary students of science, and science 
graduates (Ratcliffe 1999). 
While laypeople usually perceive anecdotal evidence as being a weaker form of 
evidence than statistical evidence or expert testimony (Hornikx 2005), arguments made 
by anecdotal evidence can be particularly persuasive in certain conditions (Koballa 
1986; Borgida and Nisbett 2006). In a review of the experimental literature, Hornikx 
(2005) found six experiments reporting that statistical evidence was more persuasive 
than anecdotal evidence, five reporting that both forms were equal, and a single study 
which found that anecdotal evidence was more persuasive.  
Considering the persuasiveness of anecdotal evidence, the ease in producing it, and 
the difficult discrediting it, it is unsurprising that it is employed so frequently to support 
non-scientific claims. 
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2.6.2 Celebrity Endorsement 
 
Celebrities are in a unique position of power when it comes to information. They have 
the power to reach millions of people that is very rarely matched with any real expertise. 
The power of celebrity has long been recognised by marketing companies who use 
celebrities for their attractiveness, likeability, and apparent trustworthiness (Erdogan 
1999). 
Jenny McCarthy, Jim Carry, Oprah Winfrey, Billy Corgan, Charlie Sheen, Denise 
Richards, Britney Spears, Rob Schneider and Hugh Hefner have all lent their celebrity, 
to some degree, to the campaign against vaccination.  Similarly, in the year 2000, the 
Foo Fighters, a multi-million album selling rock band held a concert to benefit a AIDS 
denial foundation (Talvi 2000). The endorsement of these celebrities goes beyond 
merely lending their likeability to the cause. They actively bring these causes to the 
attention of many individuals, who would otherwise not be exposed to this information. 
They also create a climate of tolerance toward the ideas they are promoting (McDonald, 
Pace et al. 2012). Due to our innately illogical nature, the appeal these celebrities have 
can be very compelling.  
In an experiment on the effect of celebrity endorsement, 415 boys were exposed to two 
different advertisements during a new animated television programme. One 
advertisement contained an endorsement, the other did not. The younger boys, aged 
eight to ten years old, were more likely to associate the endorser with expertise than 
their older counterparts aged eleven to fourteen. Despite this the preferences of each 
group for the toys being advertised, was no different (Ross, Campbell et al. 1984). This 
demonstrates that celebrity endorsement can be effective, despite our better reasoning. 
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Even when we do not recognise the endorser as an authority, we can be compelled by 
our feeling about the endorser alone. 
 
2.7 Motivations to distrust science 
 
A significant proportion of the New Zealand population holds the view that ‘seeing is 
believing’ and they are not inclined to take scientific claims on trust alone (Hipkins, 
Stockwell et al. 2002). Particular demographics within the New Zealand population 
appear to retain a high level of awareness about past dishonesties in science 
internationally, such as the misreporting of the health effects of smoking (Hipkins, 
Stockwell et al. 2002). Internationally many individuals express concern towards the 
corruption of science, most commonly through commercial and political channels. This 
has been recorded as being achieved by means such as termination and suppression of 
research, intimidation or coercion of scientists, manipulation of study designs and 
research protocols, ghost writing scientific articles and through publication bias (Grifo, 
Halpern et al. 2012).  
The greatest trust in scientific and technological advancements, come from areas where 
individuals can most clearly visualise the personal benefits of such advancements 
(Hipkins, Stockwell et al. 2002). Conversely, the segments of the population which 
shows the highest levels of concern about the consequences of new technological 
advancements, appears to be related to personal values positions (Hipkins, Stockwell et 
al. 2002). This notion was supported by a study conducted by Gauchat (2012), which 
found that between 1974 and 2010, American conservatives shifted from having the 
greatest support of science, to the having the lowest support of science, when 
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compared to their liberal and moderate counterparts. This change  was likely due to the 
politicization of scientific issues such as climate change (Dunlap and McCright 2008), 
demonstrating that individuals have a greater trust in science, when it does not conflict 
with their personal values.  
The process of science is not perfect and many of the criticisms laid upon it are valid. 
However knowledge of the methodologies of scientific research will not only increase 
trust in the field (Ratcliffe 1999; Zuccala 2009), but empower individuals to judge the 




While the accuracy of information available to the lay public is, on the whole, of a high 
standard (Giles 2005; Esquivel, Meric-Bernstam et al. 2006; Boykoff and Boykoff 2007; 
Boykoff 2008), there is an disproportionate amount of misinformation for specific topics 
addressing contentious issues (Forte and Bruckman 2008; Kortum, Edwards et al. 
2008). 
As the information landscape moves away from traditional media (Bascand 2011; 
Smith, Gibson et al. 2011), the journalistic ideal of balanced reporting, distorting the 
proportional endorsement of particular ideas (Hartz and Chappell 1997; Boykoff and 
Boykoff 2007; Boykoff 2008), will become less of a concern to science communication. 
However, peer-driven online information sharing presents new reasons for concern. 
Information sharing among opinionated users forms community clusters of likeminded 
individuals (Salathé and Khandelwal 2011; Nguyen, Yan et al. 2012), with little 
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information flow between these groups (Salathé and Khandelwal 2011). A population 
with this structure presents great difficulties in disseminating accurate information 
globally (Nguyen, Yan et al. 2012). The rise in popularity of websites such as Facebook 
and Twitter allows for even more effective dissemination of information, subsequently 
creating the possibility for the fastest flow of information yet developed, through viral 
spread of information. In cases when this information is inaccurate it will be important 
for reliable information sources to develop an appropriate response (Nguyen, Yan et al. 
2012). 
The persuasiveness of misinformation is supported by anecdotal evidence, which is 
convincing due to our emotional reasoning (Koballa 1986). Celebrity endorsement is 
also persuasive, as celebrities create a culture of trust and acceptance of their position 
(McDonald, Pace et al. 2012). The acceptance culture of misinformation is established 
further by the dissemination of pseudoscientific television broadcasting (Tsai, Shein et 
al. 2012). Complementary to this is an established culture of distrust of science, held by 
some individual (Hipkins, Stockwell et al. 2002), and the desire of individuals to 
disbelieve what contradicts their personal position (Hipkins, Stockwell et al. 2002; 
Gauchat 2012). 
Given the move towards a peer-led information exchange, the culture of acceptance of 
misinformation and pseudoscience, the increased access to information and the 
increased speed with which is can be disseminated; there are many reasons for 
concern regarding the current and future state of misinformation. 
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3. Role of Science Education 
3.0 Introduction 
 
The previous chapters have discussed the factors contributing to the establishment and 
persistence of irrational beliefs in society.  
The innate nature of human irrationality prevents even the most intelligent individuals, 
from rationally reasoning and reserving judgement in some instances (Cohen 1994). We 
find meaning in random noise (Beck and Forstmeier 2007; Foster and Kokko 2009; 
Shermer 2011); seek information that supports our preconceptions (Wason 1960), while 
ignoring and discrediting information that opposes them (Koriat, Lichtenstein et al. 
1980); are fooled by, and fool others with illogical arguments ; can be persuaded by the 
opinion of others (Asch 1951); are able to remember details that do not correspond to 
reality (Asch 1951; Loftus and Palmer 1974; Loftus and Hoffman 1989; Saunders and 
MacLeod 2002); misinterpret seemingly supernatural events as they occur (Barrett and 
Etheridge 1992); and we do all this while maintaining  a perfect model of intellectual 
integrity, to ourselves (Festinger and Carlsmith 1959).  
This irrationality has contributed to an information landscape saturated with 
misinformation. Concern can be raised over the internet’s information accuracy (Kortum, 
Edwards et al. 2008; Gluckman 2011), move towards a model of peer-led information 
distribution, and a move away from the role of information authorities (Miller and Kimmel 
2001; Nisbet, Scheufele et al. 2002). Meanwhile TV continues to present 
pseudoscience on channels promoted as educational (Hawks 2011), documentaries 
present fabricated evidence and doctored evidence, and celebrities lean their likability to 
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these irrational, and potentially harmful, positions (Erdogan 1999; McDonald, Pace et al. 
2012). Meanwhile, scientists choose not to engage with the proponents of irrationality, 
in the knowledge it will be an exercise in futility (Park 2001; Greener 2007). Trouble also 
arises as these scientists are presented as equal authorities within the debate, which 
serves largely to validate the position of their debating opponent (Park 2001). It is 
unsurprising that this landscape is so difficult to traverse successfully. Even well 
meaning, powerful and very public individuals are being easily misled (Weissmann 
2006). The misinformation landscape is so pervasive it propagates a culture which 
supports and validates irrational beliefs. 
There are many challenges in responding to the issues of irrationality and 
misinformation. Directly attempting to correct facetious information will have little 
influence, to those most committed to the idea (Festinger 1957). Simply supplying the 
correct information and hoping that individuals will draw accurate conclusions from it is 
also unlikely (Lord, Ross et al. 1979; Westen, Blagov et al. 2006). One issue in 
particular with this approach is simply that many individuals have a high need for 
cognitive closure. These individuals are complacent with the answers they receive first, 
rather than what is best supported with evidence (Anderson and Barrios 1961; 
Kruglanski and Webster 1996).   
 
3.1 Response of science education 
 
While it is not impossible to be effective when communicating non-psuedoscientific 
information, there are profound obstacles to this task. For this reason I argue that it is 
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particularly important to address human irrationality and teach reasoning for children 
during their science education.  
Astronomer and science populariser Carl Sagan, was a champion of the idea that 
science education should  focus upon rational rules of evidence generation and 
evaluation (Sagan and Steele 1996). Many support the idea science education should 
focus less on knowledge within the domains of science, and more on how knowledge is 
generated, the principles of conducting scientific research, principles of evidence 
evaluation, and rules of decision making (Sagan and Steele 1996; Monk and Osborne 
1997; Longbottom and Butler 1999). 
“Science is much more than a body of knowledge. It is a way of thinking.” - Carl 
Sagan (1990). 
3.1.1 What is being done 
 
Gluckman (2011) identifies four specific objectives of the New Zealand Science 
Curriculum. These are as firstly to provide children with the knowledge required for 
tertiary education. Secondly to understand how systems interacted and operate. Thirdly 
they need to be scientifically literate and have an understanding of how scientific 
processes operate. Lastly they need to be able to distinguish reliable from unreliable 
information.  The latter two objectives specifically respond the concerns of irrationality 
and misinformation.  
A core principal of the New Zealand Science Curriculum is ‘The Nature of Science’. This 
is how it is described by the curriculum: 
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“The Nature of Science strand is the overarching, unifying strand. Through it, 
students learn what science is and how scientists work. They develop the skills, 
attitudes, and values to build a foundation for understanding the world. They 
come to appreciate that while scientific knowledge is durable, it is also constantly 
re-evaluated in the light of new evidence. They learn how scientists carry out 
investigations, and they come to see science as a socially valuable knowledge 
system. They learn how science ideas are communicated and to make links 
between scientific knowledge and everyday decisions and actions. These 
outcomes are pursued through the following major contexts in which scientific 
knowledge has developed and continues to develop” – Ministry of Education 
(2007a). 
Several key objectives, of the nature of science, are specifically important to the issues 
raised by this thesis. These are included within the achievement aims of the science 
curriculum as early as level three/four of the curriculum (for the age range nine to 
thirteen years old). The objectives for these students includes the ability to understand 
that scientists work together and support their ideas with evidence; that the students are 
able to carry out appropriate investigations and find evidence; and are able to use their 
knowledge to explore various aspects of an issue relevant to them (Ministy of Education 
2007b). 
The objectives identified with the New Zealand Science Curriculum can teach students 
to value evidence and rationalise their position in discussions. It can also generate a 
knowledge which allows students to critically examine the reliability of various sources 
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of information. This is a very positive response to the concerns identified in both 
preceding chapters, yet there are also persisting concerns. 
3.1.2 Issues 
 
The curriculum does not encourage the communication of the reasoning behind the 
scientific method. It was demonstrated in the first chapter of this thesis that not only are 
people irrational, but that that are unable, and unwilling to admit their own fallibilities. 
Human fallibility is fundamental to the development of the scientific method and it is 
incredibly valuable to know we are fallible, when we wish to pursuit knowledge. If 
individuals are unaware of their cognitive fallibilities, they are much more likely to 
assume they have the truth, before they have asked the questions (Krauss 2012).  
While the New Zealand Curriculum does specifically encourage education, some 
aspects of the nature of science, there are still calls for concern for these areas also.  
The primary concern is hinges on the fact, that teachers control what is taught in their 
classrooms. Ultimately the effectiveness of the education, depends heavily upon the 
teachers’ understanding, and appreciation of the information being communicated. 
Unfortunately in a recent review, the New Zealand Curriculum was found to have very 
little effect on the way science is taught in schools (Gluckman 2011). Another review 
found that many schools demonstrated a lack of knowledge and understanding of the 
science curriculum requirements, with only 27% of schools achieving a rating of 
‘generally effective’ or better science education standards (Educational Review Office 
2012).  
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A large contributor to the success or failure of  science education is the competence of 
the lead teachers in each department (Educational Review Office 2012). Due to the 
stated objective of the New Zealand Science Curriculum, and the goals it hopes to 
attain for levels three/four, it is very important that teachers, even at a primary level, 
value and champion scientific principles. However a study of 232 Australian teaching 
undergraduates found the participants to be largely unwilling to refute new age beliefs. 
In some instances the believers even outnumbered the rejecters (UFOs, séances, and 
Nostradamus predictions). The study concluded that students of these prospective 
teachers are unlikely to benefit from any informed Scepticism during their primary 
education (Yates and Chandler 2000). It is an unfortunate reality that unless a teacher 
champions the values of scientific enquiry, this is unlikely to be communicated in the 




Solutions to increasing the implementation of the New Zealand Science Curriculum 
have been proposed by other reports (Gluckman 2011; Educational Review Office 
2012) and are beyond the scope of this thesis. Similarly I have no recommendation for 
teachers who do not value the principles of scepticism and the scientific enquiry.  
However I am confident about the benefit of specific education regarding irrationality 
and misinformation. Education which focuses on developing an understanding of the 
cognitive processes, that hinder our pursuit of knowledge, as well as the cognitive 
justification of the scientific method, along with the practices for a strong and 
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appropriate study, will be of great value to students. This will allow students to 
appreciate the importance of the scientific method, specifically as a necessary tool to 
counter innate irrationality. I argue that it is equally important to know why we might be 
wrong, as it is to know how we can be right.  
This education will create a greater value for the principles of science, and in turn will 
allow the students to more accurately be able to judge the value of various sources of 
information. If the students are able to understand their own fallibilities, then seeing 
these in others is very natural step. Educating students about their cognitive faults, 
empowers them to overcome them. 
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4. Science Workshops 
4.0. Introduction 
 
As demonstrated in the previous chapters, understanding the scientific method, as well 
as the justifications for the scientific approach, are critical for individuals to learn, to aid 
them to overcome their own innate irrationality, as well as to navigate through the sea of 
potentially inaccurate information.  
This study was designed to test children on their comprehension of the scientific 
method. It also aimed to understand how effectively the scientific method is being taught 
in foundational science classes and how effectively this information about science can 




A series of science classroom workshops were conducted with students from within the 
greater Dunedin area. The workshops were aimed at students who should be 
completing levels three/four of the New Zealand Curriculum. The age groups of the 
children ranged between eight and thirteen. The workshop endeavoured to determine if 
the stated objective of the curriculum were being met, particularly those within the 
‘nature of science’. These workshops also sought to determine how effective a single 
workshop session could be in communicating the core principles and justifications of the 
scientific method to the students across this age range. 
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Prior to conducting these workshops, interviews were conducted with randomly selected 
students. These interviews were repeated one month after the workshop. No specific 
number of interviews was predefined, instead the decision to cease interviews was 
made qualitatively. Interviews continued until the responses from the students became 
repetitive, and it was deemed unlikely that new responses would be recorded. 
Reflection notes of the workshops were also taken.  
This study was conducted with approval of the University of Otago Human Ethics 
(Ethics Committee Reference Code: 11/149. Appendix 4.1.). A requirement for this 
approval was the informed consent of the students a legal guardian. Subsequently both 
a consent form and an information sheet were produced and distributed to the legal 
guardians prior to the workshops (Appendix 4.2 and 4.3.). All participating students 
were able to return completed consent forms on time, so it was not necessary to 
remove any students from the classes. In all cases the teachers of the classes were 
present to aid in the workshop.  
Three schools were selected for participation in this study, chosen to comply with 
requirements for access to students and the age range of students. One schools was a 
primary school, from which both a regular class (P1a) and a gifted class (P1b) 
participated. The remaining two schools were at the secondary level (H1 and H2). In 
total 84 students from 4 classes participated in the workshops, with personal interviews 
held with 30 students (Table 4.1).   
Both high schools had specific science education conducted by specialised science 
teachers. All high school students involved with the workshops had participate in 
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specialised science education. The P1a students had not received specific science 
education. Instead this classrooms employed scientific demonstrations and information 
in a more generalised class plan. The ‘gifted’ students from the same primary school 
had in the past received special visits and demonstrations from local scientists. 
Additionally several of the students attended Pākiki Kids, a programme for gifted 
children which included science lessons. This programme met once each week. 
 
4.1.1  Workshop design 
 
The workshops consisted of two distinct 50 minute sections. These were conducted 
either in a single block, or on separate occasions separated by one week, depending on 
student accessibility. The first section was designed to assess the student’s general 
understanding of science, and to discuss and debate the importance of the scientific 
method. The second section allowed the student to demonstrate their understanding of 
science by designing and conducting simple experiments themselves, followed by a 
brief informal discussion of the results. 
Section one began by discussing what science is, and why it is important to us. The key 
idea being communicated was that science is a means to answer questions that we do 
Table 4.1. Student participants and interviewee numbers for each of the four participating 
classrooms. 
School No. Students  Ages No. Interviews 
Primary School (P1a) 24 8-9 10 
Primary School, Gifted and Talented 
Students (P1b) 
6 9-10 6 
High School 1 (H1)  24 11-13 8 
High School 2 (H2) 30 11-12 7 
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not already have answers to. This was followed by a simple discussion of the best way 
to find answers, while making sure you do not make mistakes. This discussion was then 
linked back to the ideas of the scientific method, demonstrating that there were simple, 
logical tools to aide us in trying to determine objective truth. Time was also spent in 
discussion on how the students could use the scientific method in their classes, to help 
them appreciate the work they do and by making them feel more connected to 
professional scientists. The latter time of this section was held in discussion of what to 
do after the completion of an experiment, and why communicating science is so 
important. The key ideas being communicated were that both positive and negative 
results added to the body of scientific knowledge, and that sharing information was 
important, as it allowed an individual’s work to be reviewed for errors, weakness, 
reproducibility and then compared to the existing body of knowledge.   
At the beginning of the second section of the workshops, students were asked to 
participate in a simple science demonstration. The demonstrations chosen were 
determined by the science module the students were currently covering in their science 
classes, as detailed in the ‘workshop reflections’ section of each school (sections: 
4.2.1.2, 4.2.2.2, 4.2.3.2 and 4.2.4.2). After each demonstration had been completed the 
students were asked if they believed what they had been doing was science. A short 
discussion was then held, to determine if they had followed the scientific method, and if 
they had gained any information they did not have before the demonstration began. 
This discussion was followed by time for the students to propose questions that could 
be answered by modifying the experiments, or by using the resources in novel ways. 
The students were then requested to design and conduct these experiments with 
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minimal guidance from the supervisors. At the end of this section some time was spent 
discussing results, swapping methods and reviewing the process. In the last moments 
of the workshop the value of the scientific method was recapped, by using experience 
from the second section of the class, and the experiments the students had conducted 
as examples. 
4.1.2. Measuring scientific competency in interviews 
 
Interview questions were modified from Carey, Evans et al.(1989) (Appendix 4.4).  The 
decision was made to conduct interviews rather than questionnaires, primarily because 
of the additional value in gauging competency in an oral dialogue, as well as providing 
the means to elaborate on unclear or ambiguous responses to questions and to clarify 
terminology. 
Interviews lasted from between five and fifteen minutes. No time limit was given to the 
students for any responses. Effort was made to retain a single interview structure 
throughout the interviews, however interviews were modified slightly in some instances. 
This was usually in response to students answering later questions during detailed 
responses to earlier questions, or failing to answer earlier questions, which were 
requisite to later ones. Recordings of all interviews were kept for later analysis.  
Interviews were reviewed in two ways. Initially they were listened to unedited, in an 
attempt to review the confidence and appropriate terminology with which answers were 
given. This also allowed for a review of key terms and concepts, which might reflect the 
student’s exposure to, or understanding of key concepts in science. Secondly a score 
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was given to each answer to reflect the competency (Table 4.2). This score reflected 
not only the understanding demonstrated, but also the confidence with which the 
answer was given. This scale allowed for a more ready review of the overall 
understanding of science the students possessed, and their ability to communicate it. 
The scaled responses also allowed easier comparison of the students between the 
different classrooms who participated. 
 
4.1.3. Measuring scientific competency through observation and interaction 
 
To accompany the information from the interviews, reflections of the in-classroom 
experience were recorded after each visit. Effort was made to record observations of 
students’ knowledge of science, and the scientific process; their ability to design and 
conduct simple experiments and to discuss the methods and results effectively. This 
was accompanied by observations of the social and structural dynamic of the class 
rooms, the behaviour of the students, and their general behaviour and interaction. 
The judgement criteria of student competency during observation and interaction within 
the workshop were considered on three main criteria, as defined below:  
1. Knowledge of science 
Table 4.2. Criteria of competence for scoring student responses. 
Score Description 
0 “I don't know”; incorrect answer or no answer given. 
1 Very poor understanding. 
2 Poor or somewhat inaccurate understanding.  
3 Moderate understanding and/or examples given. 
4 Good understanding; able to communicate key ideas; accurate examples given. 




Do the students have knowledge of the principals of the scientific method? 
 Can they demonstrate specific knowledge of: 
  Finding and asking questions? 
Proposing hypotheses? 
Designing and conducting experiments/observations? 
Communicating results? 
 Can the students use this knowledge in examples? 
Do the student’s understand the role of: 
A scientist? 
The scientific community? 
Communication in science? 
The existing body of scientific knowledge? 
2. Ability to communicate science 
Are the students able to demonstrate an understanding of the following terms? 
  A hypothesis. 
   Can they distinguish between a hypothesis and a guess? 
  An experiment. 
Are the student able to understand and use scientific 
terminology? 




3. Ability to conduct and demonstrate scientific inquiry 
Can the students ask appropriate questions about the material being examined? 
Can the students design a fair test to answer their questions? 
Are the students able to draw accurate conclusions from their tests?  
 
4.1.5 Statistical Analysis  
 
Due to the non-parametric nature of the data collected, Wilcoxon signed-rank test were 
used to compare score interview results, using IBM SPSS 20. These were performed to 
test for a difference in understanding of science before and after the workshop was 




4.2.1 Primary school, regular class (P1a) 
 
P1 was an urban school. The student body represented years one through six and was 
coeducational. The school was state funded, has a role of approximately 227 students 
and is listed as decile eight. The classroom participating in the workshop consisted of 
24 students, ten of whom participated in the interview process. 
4.2.1.1 Prior to workshop 
Results are displayed in Figure 4.1. 
 73 
The students had very little knowledge of science prior to the workshop. Competent 
answers were returned sporadically by different students, potentially demonstrating 
knowledge of specific aspects of science, or potentially just the result of a good guess. 
This response pattern was reflected in the large error bars (Figure 4.1).  The responses 
were weakest for questions specifically regarding the scientific method. The strongest 
responses from the students concerned the need to communicate the results after a 
positive experiment, with four of the students responding that the results needed to be 
shared, so people knew what had been done.  
4.2.1.2 Reflections from the workshop  
The students were very excited about the workshop and were very eager to participate 
in the experiments. This made the lesson plan difficult as the class was easily 
distracted, when attempts were made to engage them in theoretical discussion. It was 
possible to communicate some key concepts as the class were well behaved, however 
it quickly became apparent that the best means of communicating the theoretical 
material, was during the practical demonstrations. This was an effective means of 
communication for the younger class, however a slightly different approach was used 
for the other classrooms visited.  
The classroom dynamic was extremely open. Six girls sat together at the back of the 
class, and were sheepish about the idea of participating, despite positive 
encouragement from both the host and the teacher. Otherwise the class showed very 
enthusiastic participation in both the practical demonstrations and when offering 
responses to questions being asked. 
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The enthusiastic and excitable nature of the classroom twice became detrimental to the 
discussion and reflection process. These moments were quickly cooled by the host and 
teacher. At all other times the student’s participation in the discussion demonstrated 
genuine involvement with the ideas being communicated.  
Due to the excitable nature of these younger students it was necessary to run a single 
experiment with them. Having smaller groups would have been unmanageable. The 
students were studying static electricity in their classroom, so a Van der Graaf generator 
was employed for the experiment. The students were given a demonstration of the 
generator and some simple explanation of what was happening. It was possible for the 
students to understand a good deal more than expected, as they had recently 
conducted experiments using balloons to generate static electricity in their classroom. 
The students were then asked to ask questions about the generator. Once a question 
had been agreed upon the students offered hypotheses of what they expected to 
happen. The experiments conducted answered questions including ‘what would happen 
if a balloon touched the generator?’; ‘what would happen if a person touched the floor 
while using the generator?’; ‘what works best, a metal or a plastic chair to stand on?’; 
‘what happens if two of more people form a chain while using the generator?’; etc.  The 
student’s ability to ask questions about the generator were very good, although often 
impractical. Their ability to offer hypotheses was less well formed and they usually 
resorted to guessing. However the host always inquired about their rationale, whenever 
a hypothesis was offered. 
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The ability of the students to retain key ideas about the scientific method was less than 
expected, upon the finial recap of the session. This may reflect their inability to connect 
the theoretical concepts discussed with the practical experiments conducted, despite 
the efforts of the host. With encouragement the students were able to demonstrate they 
understood many key concepts covered in the workshop, however these were 
understood as ideas, or examples from times during the lesson, rather than as 
understand of the concepts or theory that had been communicated.  
4.2.1.3 After Workshop 
Results displayed in Figure 4.1. 
After the workshop the student’s understanding of the principles of the scientific method 
were improved (p <0.01), though still low over all. All but two of the students could 
define a hypothesis, and all but one student could define an experiment. No student 
could define neither. The results revealed a decreased understanding of the importance 
of sharing the results after an experiment, instead the students favoured conducting 
new experiments immediately after finishing the last. This possibly reflects the nature of 
the workshop, which saw many small experiments conducted within a short time frame. 
While discussion of results did occur, the importance of this was possibly not 







Figure 4.1. Mean (± SE) competency of responses given by students of P1a classroom, during interviews, before and after a science workshop. 
Questions have been modified for allow for space limitations on graph. Full question text available in appendix 4.4. Blue= before workshop, Green = 






























































4.2.2. Primary school, gifted and talented students (P1b) 
 
P1 school ran a small class for the students who had been classified as “gifted and 
talented”. This class met once a week for special activities. There were six students in 
the class, all of whom participated in the interview process. 
4.2.2.1 Prior to workshop 
 
Results are displayed in Figure 4.2. 
The students displayed a very good understanding of science. Two of the students 
scored near perfect scores and were able to give accurate detail regarding the scientific 
method. The other students showed a good understanding of most the questions, and 
gave answers with a great deal of confidence. Three individuals revealed a relative lack 
of knowledge regarding experimental design. The weakest responses overall from the 
students arose in response to how a scientist should proceed from an experiment in 
which the results contradict their original hypothesis. Most students thought a scientist 
should immediately try something else, and alluded to the fact that this would be 
embarrassing.  
4.2.2.2 Reflections from workshop 
 
The students had participated fully in both the discussion and practical aspects of the 
workshop. All students enthusiastically offered responses to questions asked of them, 
and communicated a very good understanding of science in general. The students were 




any other class worked with. This may reflect their “gifted” natures, but was also 
influenced by the very small class size, allowing for a more natural exchange of ideas. 
The experiment used with these students involved asking questions about glurch, a 
polyvinyl acetate and sodium borate mix, which produces a product similar to 
commercially available “silly putty”.  After the students had made a batch, each the 
class reflected on the process, and asked if they had been doing ‘science’. The students 
quickly found that they had asked no questions or tested a hypothesis, as the host had 
informed them about the product they were going to create at the beginning of the 
activity. While not all the students fully agreed, the consensus was that they had not 
“really” done any science. The class was then encouraged to ask questions of the 
experiment. At first the students wanted to know if the glurch would bounce, and to 
discover other simple properties of it. Because of their enthusiasm, it was necessary for 
the host to encourage them to ask more reaching questions. Experiments were 
designed to determine the result of adding extra sodium borate to the gulch they had 
created, as well as making a new batch with a sodium borate solution which was twice 
as concentrated. The students could make hypotheses freely, with strong 
rationalisations supporting them.  
Upon final recap of the workshop, the students could readily recount the lesson and the 






4.2.2.3 After Workshop 
 
Results are displayed in Figure 4.2. 
Little change was observed after the workshop (p = 0.32). Any changes observed were 
likely influenced by the student’s increased rapport with the interviewer. The repeated 
interviews revealed that the language used by the students had changed very little. This 
may be due to the student’s remembering their responses from the previous interview. 
The one key concept of the workshop that could have benefitted the students was the 
value of an experiment returning a negative result. However this concept was not 
communicated in the student responses any better than prior to the workshop. This 







Figure 4.2. Mean (± SE) competency of responses given by students of P1b classroom, during interviews, before and after a science workshop. 
Questions have been modified for allow for space limitations on graph. Full question text available in appendix 4.4.Blue= before workshop, Green = 




























































4.2.3 High School 1 (H1) 
 
H1 was a predominantly rural school. The student body represented years seven 
through thirteen and was co-educational. The school was state funded, had a role of 
approximately 203 students and was listed as decile five. The classroom participating in 
the workshop consisted of 24 students, eight of whom participated in the interview 
process. 
4.2.3.1 Interview before workshop 
 
Results displayed in Figure 4.3. 
The students overall were largely unable to communicate the key concepts when asked 
to define the term ‘science’. However the students demonstrated significant variability in 
their understanding, with scores returned between 0 and 4. The students were able to 
confidently respond to why science was important, and gave diverse examples of the 
benefits science gives to society. No student interviewed was able to give any 
significant detail about the scientific method, returning an average score of just 0.5. A 
poor to moderate understanding of the purpose of science, and the character of 
scientists was demonstrated. A scientist’s inspiration was also poorly understood, with 
most answers returned reflecting that the students believed that scientist’s just get ideas 
“from their heads”. Only one student alluded to the work of a scientist building upon 
previous work. No student understood the term ‘hypothesis’. Responses to questions 
regarding the nature of an experiment showed that the students understood why 




experiment in favour of the hypothesis being tested most students believed the scientist 
should make the result “public”. However the reasoning of this response was either 
unknown, or for financial benefit. No student mentioned sharing the results from a 
negative experiment, and instead suggested abandoning the idea, or changing it until it 
worked. 
An overall description of the students understanding of science would be heavily 
weighted toward the role or an inventor/product tester. All but one of the students gave 
examples indicating that responses were specific to testing a product, rather than a 
hypothesis (e.g. after a successful experiment, a scientist would “sell it”). Responses 
also reflected a trend of students perceiving scientist working independently. Only one 
student alluded to the work of other scientist, with one other student mentioning the role 
of the previous work of a scientist. The responses from the interview suggested the 
students knew nothing of the importance of communication between scientists.  
4.2.2.2 Reflections from workshop 
 
The students were happy to participate in the group discussion, with a very high level of 
overall participation. Discussion progressed smoothly with the students demonstrating 
an understanding of key concepts quickly upon introduction. Participation of the 
students was largely led by a smaller number of individuals, however due to the nature 
of the classroom dynamic, involvement of all students was easily encouraged. 
The demonstration the student were shown involved making a cloud in a bottle. The 




1. Strike a match and drop it into a plastic bottle containing a small amount of 
water. 
2. Tightly screw on the cap and vigorously shake the bottle for a few seconds. 
3. Quickly apply pressure to the bottle by squeezing it with your hands. 
4. Release the pressure and observe the cloud that has formed inside the bottle. 
The students worked in pairs. Once each pair had demonstrated that they could 
produce a cloud, they were asked to design an experiment to make increase the opacity 
of the cloud they produced. The students eagerly and readily produced many different 
hypotheses to achieve this. Examples included increasing the water content of the 
bottle, increasing the number of matches used, and increasing the pressure applied to 
the bottle. The students required a small amount of guidance during their 
experimenting, primarily to make sure they only changed one variable at a time. 
Otherwise they conducted their experiments very competently. The students were then 
called together to discuss their experiment designs and their results. No pair reported 
that their hypothesis had not increased the opacity of their clouds, demonstrating the 
desire to have found a ‘correct’ answer. When the students had repeated each other’s 
experimental designs it was concluded that the greatest change was achieved by 






4.2.2.3 Interview after workshop 
 
Results are displayed in Figure 4.3. 
After the workshop the student responses indicated that their general understanding of 
science was unchanged (p = 0.14). However, the key concept of science trying to find 
out new information was well communicated in their responses. Again the students 
demonstrated a low understanding of the role of past work in establishing new ideas. 
There was a modest increase in the understanding of a hypotheses (p < 0.05) with five 
of the eight students being able to demonstrate some understanding. The students also 
showed a significant increase in knowledge of experimental design (p < 0.05), with four 
students demonstrating basic understanding of experimental design. The students also 
demonstrated a significant increase in their understanding of the importance of 
communicating the results of an experiments, though again failed to recognise the 
importance of sharing a negative result. The students also communicated the 
importance of having the results of a positive experiment checked for errors.  
Overall the students understanding of science was largely unchanged after the 
workshop however some key concepts were retained. Only a single student alluded to 
the role of a scientist as that of a product tester or inventor. The students also 
understood the importance of communication between scientist, and the reservation of 






Figure 4.3. Mean (± SE) competency of responses given by students of H1 classroom, during interviews, before and after a science workshop. 
Questions have been modified for allow for space limitations on graph. Full question text available in appendix 4.4. Blue= before workshop, Green = 































































4.2.4 High School 2 (H2) 
 
H2 is an urban school. The student body represents years seven through thirteen and is 
male only. The school received state and private funding, has a role of approximately 
525 students and is listed as decile ten. The classroom participating in the workshop 
consisted of 30 students, ten of whom participated in the interview process. 
4.2.4.1 Interview before workshop 
 
Results are displayed in Figure 4.4. 
The student’s definitions of science implied they saw it largely as a body of knowledge, 
with no students alluding to the scientific methods, or any protocols of science in their 
responses. Four of the seven students responded that science was ‘everything’. No 
students defined science as a means to discover new information, though this concept 
was alluded to in later responses. For example, when asked what scientists do once 
they have an idea, most students responded that the idea should be tested with an 
experiment. The students were able to attribute curiosity as a characteristic of a 
scientist, and had a moderate understanding of the benefits of scientific endeavours. 
The students had some understanding of how science was conducted, with most 
mentioning particular aspects of the scientific method. The majority of the students felt 
that scientists got their ideas from problems they saw around them, or questions they 
wanted to answer. Only two students thought that scientists’ ideas “just popped into 
their heads”, but no students mentioned the work of other scientists, or the body of 




understanding of the term hypothesis, with one student achieving a competency score 
of five. The student definitions of an experiment were slightly less competent, with two 
students describing an experiments simply as “doing something”. The students had little 
knowledge of what scientist’s do after an experiment has been run. Only a single 
student understood the results of an experiment should be shared, however this student 
believed this should only be so it the result was positive. Unanimously the students 
believed that negative results should see the scientist either start over or change their 
experiment.  
4.2.4.2 Reflections from workshop 
 
The students were largely well behaved, with the exception of a few students who 
talked among themselves, or distracted themselves on cell phones. The remaining 
students were very orderly and attentive. The classroom was run very formally, not due 
to any instruction from the host, but rather due the habituation of the students. 
Participation in the class was low, with three students clearly being most enthusiastic to 
respond to queries. An effort was made to direct questions to those less forthcoming, 
but overall participation was achieved reluctantly, and discussion was tenuous. This 
probably reflects both the culture of the school and the nature of the students, not offer 
answer unless they are sure of themselves. This was exasperated by the fact the 
workshop material was outside of the material they had covered in their lessons. 
The experiment the class conducted was designed to map the senses of taste on the 
tongue. While the concept of a tongue map has been debunked by science (Collings 




instructions were simply to construct a map of the tongue, using the scientific method. 
Resources supplies were pens and paper, citric acid (sour), 99% cocoa chocolate 
(bitter), sugar (sweet), powdered parmesan cheese (umami) and salt. For logistical 
reasons these flavours were distributed at the front of the classroom by the workshop 
host. 
Surprisingly, when the activity was started the students immediately constructed tongue 
maps, without a single student leaving their seat, or taking any of the flavours provided. 
It became apparent that the students were not planning to take the flavours at all, thus 
making it necessary to halt the class for a discussion. When ask how confident each 
group was with their maps each groups reported a good deal of confidence. This 
allowed further enquiry as to why there was significant differences between groups, yet 
all groups were confidence in their constructed maps. When asked why they did not use 
the ingredients when constructing their tongue maps, the students did not give any 
meaningful response. Discourse with the teacher afterwards revealed the students may 
have seen this activity as a test of their knowledge, rather than an exercise in 
experimental design. This despite the class being given express instructions of the 
nature of the activity, and having been talked through each of the resources available 
for them to use. 
After this discussion the students were informed they could use their constructed maps 
as a hypothesis, and were now required to design and conduct their experiments. 
Primary signs were again disheartening with one group immediately eating all of their 




three distinct designs. Design one was for each member of the group to cover their 
tongues with all the flavours simultaneously, then compare the localised taste 
sensitivities, design two saw each member of the groups dab specified areas of their 
tongues with each flavour separately, then record when each was most sensitive and 
design three saw each member cover their tongue with each flavour separately and 
then compare sensitivity. No group had its members conduct individual tongue maps 
prior to within-group comparison.  
When the groups were certain of their answers, they had not only all constructed 
‘maps’, but had all confirmed their original hypothesis to have been accurate. After it 
was revealed to the students that there is no such thing as a tongue map several 
students announced that they had not been able to taste any difference. Asked why 
they had not reported this in their finding, the students reported that they had been 
influenced by the group. This was an excellent opportunity to discuss the group effect, 
as well as the discussing how such an event could have been avoided if the students 
had first made individual maps to then compare, to avoid group influence. Discussion 
was then moved to why the students had discovered a positive result at all. The only 
response given being that the host had requested them too. This lead on to valuable 
discussion of conformational bias, and the importance of a negative hypothesis. 
In discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of each experimental type, the students 
were unable to communicate any ideas. This may reflect their desire not to offer an 
answer unless they are sure of it, but also implies that no thought had gone into the 




4.2.4.3 Interview after the workshop 
 
Results are displayed in Figure. 4.4 
The overall knowledge of science significantly increased after the workshop (p < 0.01). 
After the workshop only two students retained “everything” as their definition of science. 
Overall the students demonstrated a wider understanding of science, with the concepts 
of finding new information and the procedures of the scientific method represented in 
their responses. The students could also more readily give greater details about 
specifics of the scientific method, and recited these more confidently. While a few 
students demonstrated an increased understanding of experimental design, they still 
failed to show an understanding of the control of variables. The importance of 
communication after an experiment was this time well communicated in the student’s 
responses, however they did not communicate the role of communication after a 






Figure 4.4. Competency of responses given by students of H2 classroom, during interviews, before and after a science workshop. Questions have 
been modified for allow for space limitations on graph. Full question text available in appendix 4.4. Blue= before workshop, Green = after workshop. 


























































4.2.5 Between school comparison 
 
4.2.5.1 Interview comparison 
 
Results are displayed in Figure 4.5 (before the workshop) and Figure 4.6 (after the 
workshop). 
The competency in responses given by the two high-school classes, in their interviews 
before the workshop, were the most similar within the study (p = 0.41). This was not the 
case after the workshops (p < 0.01). This indicates that H2 significantly increase their 
knowledge of science after the workshops, relative to H1. H1 and P1a also did not 
demonstrate significantly different knowledge before the workshops (P = 0.13). In this 
case however the two groups remained non-significantly different in their responses 
after the workshop (p = 0.15). All other classes were significantly different from one 
another (p<0.05), for both the interviews before and after the workshops. It can this be 
stated with confidence that the greatest level of scientific competency was 
demonstrated by P1b, followed by H2, with H1 and P1a demonstrating the least 
competency. 
4.2.5.2 Workshop  comparison 
 
The observations made during the workshops with the two high school classes were 
very interesting.  Participation within the H1 classroom was much higher than in the H2 
classroom, with students demonstrating greater engagement with both the host and 
each other, a greater willingness to ask questions and generally greater enthusiasm for 




H1 demonstrated a much greater ability to design and conduct a novel scientific 
experiment than H2. Students from H1 were able to construct and test hypothesis, and 
were able to apply key concepts of the scientific method during both experimentation, 
and during discussion. H2 did not demonstrate an ability to design or conduct a novel 
experiment without significant involvement from both the host and the teacher. They 
were also unable to apply key concepts from the scientific method into discussion of 
their experiments, and only very basic application of these concepts was evidence in 
their experimental designs. Overall the ability to apply and understand the key concepts 
which were communicated during the workshop, was much better demonstrated by H1. 
P1b demonstrated the greatest competence overall. They not only demonstrated and 
articulated the key concepts of the scientific method clearly and accurately, but they 
were able to apply this to the design and conduction of their experiments. 
Judged upon theoretical knowledge of the scientific methods at the beginning of the 
workshop, P1b and H2 performed the best, while P1a and H1 were both notably less 
knowledgeable.  By the end of the workshop the H1 students were also able to 
demonstrate a theoretical knowledge much closer to that of HS2 and P1a. Judged on 
their ability to design and conduct novel experiments, and apply principals of the 
































































































































Figure 4.5. Mean (± SE) competency of responses given by students of all classes, when interviewed before the workshop. Questions have been modified for 
allow for space limitations on graph. Full question text available in appendix 4.4. Blue = P1a (n = 10), Red = P1b (n = 6), Green= H1 (n = 8), Purple = H2 (n = 7). 















Figure 4.6. Mean (± SE) competency of responses given by students of all classes, when interviewed after the workshop. Questions have been modified for allow 
for space limitations on graph. Full question text available in appendix 4.4. Blue = P1a (n = 10), Red = P1b (n = 6), Green= H1 (n = 8), Purple = H2 (n = 7). Max 







4.3.1 Effectiveness of workshops 
 
Comparison of the responses given to each questions, before and after the workshops, 
reveals Only the P1a and H2 classes increased in scientific competency was after the 
workshops (Table 4.3).  
 
It is likely that P1b showed no significant improvement in scientific competency due to 
their high initial knowledge. This was reflected by the answers they gave to interview 
questions, which used much lot of the same terminology in both interviews, indicating 
their understanding of concepts was well established. 
Conversely, the significant improvements demonstrated by P1 is likely due to the very 
low initial competency. The discussion at the end of the workshop revealed they 
students had trouble linking the practice, with the theory of the scientific process. During 
the interviews after the workshop the students demonstrated some retention of certain 
scientific terminology (i.e. ‘hypothesis’, ‘experiment’). This change was sufficient to 
return a significant increase of competency for the students interviewed. 
Table 4.3. Comparison of competency demonstrated in interviews before and after 
workshops, using Wilcoxon signed-rank test of mean competency of each interview question. 
School P-Value Significant? 
P1a <0.01 Yes 
P1b 0.32 No 
H1 0.14 No 







H1 showed a non-significant increase in comprehension of science following their 
workshop. This result was particularly surprising as the class had performed so well 
during the workshop. An explanation into this performance may be due to the nature of 
their regular science education class. During the interviews several students had made 
specific reference to their lack of enjoyment of their science classes. This sentiment was 
endorsed by the liaison teacher at the school.  
The significant increase in scientific competency of H2 is also confusing. H2 showed not 
only very little ability to apply the scientific method during the workshop, but also a 
relative disengagement from the workshop overall, compared to other schools. Unlike 
the other schools involved, only H2 received largely negative feedback on their ability to 
design and conduct experiments. It is possible that this simply led them to learn more 
from their mistakes than the other classes leant from their successes. An alternative 
explanation was that the student’s science teacher learnt about their class’s inability to 
conduct a science experiment. This may have led them address the issues revealed by 
the workshop, and thus inadvertently influence the results.   
4.3.2 Differences between schools 
 
While H2 significantly exceeded the scientific competency of P1a (p < 0.01)(Figures 4.5 
a 4.6), this was not true of H1 (P = 0.13). This result is unexpected as H1 had received 
specific science education, where P1a had not. P1b demonstrated significantly greater 
competence than both of these High School classes (p < 0.01). The students who 






However once a week these students meet for various activities. In the past these 
activities had included visits from scientists. Several of the students also attend extra-
curricular classes which can involve interaction with science and scientists. Finally two 
of the students communicated that they had parents who were scientists. These 
individuals demonstrated the greatest competency of any individuals participating in the 
study.  
Comparison of H1 and H2 was very interesting. H1 had less knowledge of science and 
science terminology than H2. Despite this they were much more receptive to ideas 
communicated during the workshop, and demonstrated application of these ideas when 
designing and conducting experiments. However it was H2 who demonstrated an 
increased science competency in the later interviews. 
The difference between H1 and H2 may reflect their learning environments. H1 has a 
very relaxed classroom dynamic compared to the stricter, more traditional H2 dynamic. 
There is some evidence for a stricter model of education success, such as high 
expectations, high-dosage tutoring and the use of data to guide instruction can be 
successful  in encouraging learning (Dobbie and Fryer Jr 2011), however the 
implications of these environments into the practical application of knowledge is more 
difficult to ascertain. It was very difficult to compare the effectiveness of different 
education types (Nóvoa and Yariv-Mashal 2003; Simola 2005) due to the myriad of 






4.3.3. Criticisms of process 
4.3.3.1  Interview process 
 
There were several problems encountered during the interview process. The first of 
these was the shy and reserved nature of some of the students during the initially 
interview, compared the later interviews. Specific students from P1a and H1 were 
notably nervous during their first interview. However after that session and the 
workshop, they were less nervous during the second interview. It is unclear how this 
may have influenced the responses given during either interview. This could have been 
remedied first working with the students in some manner, so they were more familiar 
and comfortable while interacting in the interviewer. 
4.3.3.2 Workshop process 
 
One of the key intentions of the workshop was to determine the ability of the students to 
design and conduct novel scientific experiment through the application of key scientific 
concepts communicated during the sessions. By granting the students this freedom of 
experimental design and conduct, a large variance in technique was expected. Due to 
this it was determined that the specific topics for experimentation were of little 
importance to the workshop, and instead emphasis was placed on performing 
experiments in the current focus of the classes’ lesson plans. 
However had the experiments been consistent at each workshop, much more accurate 






comparison of the variety and rationalisation of hypothesis and experimental design, 




Unfortunately very little can be confidently concluded from this study. What can be 
demonstrated clearly is that specific science education does increase science 
knowledge, with P1a having consistently the lowest competency with science. However 
the poor practical performance of H2 suggests that specific science education was less 
important for the application of science into practice. The results from P1b demonstrate 
that exposure to science other than specific science education could be more important 
in encouraging science comprehension.  
While the key concepts of science seemed to be understood and applied well by all 
classes other than H2, this information did not increase the comprehension apparent in 
responses to interview question in any school other than H2. Subsequently it is not 
possible to conclude that the workshops were valuable to the student’s knowledge of 
science. 
While the H2 students had a greater knowledge of science, and a greater retention of 
science theory from the workshop, the H1 students were much better at applying the 
theory of science to the practice of science. H2 students subsequently demonstrated 
that a good understanding of science and science terminology does not directly 






simply learning about science and understanding science terminology is not sufficient 








It is important to consider that irrational belief is a fundamental aspect of human nature. 
It is not the product of ignorance, nor can it easily be refuted with logical arguments or 
strong evidence. It is also detrimental to the goal of a science communicator, to dismiss 
illogical arguments or other poor forms of evidence, as these arguments are often 
compelling to large numbers of people. Simply put, strong arguments supported by 
evidence, are often insufficient to correct beliefs supported irrationally. Conceivably, 
logical arguments are at times even less effective than arguments that appeal to our 
innate illogical reasoning.  
Attempting to communicate accurate scientific information to irrational individuals, is 
further hindered by a well established culture which validates and enforces sources of 
misinformation. While this is often contrary to specifically scientific information, it is 
always contrary to the ideals of scientific scepticism and reasoned evidence. 
Complicating the dissemination of accurate information is the global move towards 
peer-led information exchange over the internet. This medium allows all individuals to 
create and spread misinformation unhindered. It should be considered a significant 
obstacle to those who wish to communicate accurate scientific information. 
While the fundamental principles of scientific enquiry and scepticism can be largely 
ineffective when applied to challenging irrational beliefs, there is hope of addressing 
these problems, through science education. 
Teaching students the cognitive justification of the scientific method, along with the 






navigate the information landscape more skilfully, and developed a greater 
discrimination of the quality of evidence they encounter.  
This education is consistent with the stated objectives of the New Zealand science 
curriculum. The ‘nature of science’ topic within the New Zealand Science Curriculum, 
specifically aims to communicate the principles of scientific enquiry to students. 
However, no part of the curriculum endeavours to teach the students their cognitive 
limitations (i,e. human irrationally). Communicating this information may allow the 
students to develop a greater appreciation of the principles of the scientific process. 
This will also allow the students not only to recognise irrational reasoning in the 
arguments of others, but also be aware when they are supporting beliefs irrationally 
themselves. 
The attempt made by this thesis to investigate the effectiveness of a workshop aimed at 
communicating the cognitive justification of the scientific method, was largely 
inconclusive. However some observations of note were made. The key concepts of 
science communicated to the classes were understood and applied well by all classes 
during the practical sections of the workshop, with the notable exception of H2. However 
H2 retained and communicated the knowledge taught in the workshops, in interviews a 
month later. While the H2 students had a greater knowledge of science, and a greater 
retention of science theory from the workshop, all other classes were better at applying 
the theory of science to the practice of science. H2 students subsequently 
demonstrated that a good understanding of science and science terminology does not 






observations support the position that simply learning scientific information and 
understanding science terminology is not sufficient for a student to appreciate the 
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4.1  Ethics Approval Form 
Application to the University of Otago Human Ethics Committee for Ethical Approval of a 
Research or Teaching Proposal involving Human Participants 
PLEASE read carefully the important notes on the last page of this form.  Provide a response to 
each question; failure to do so may delay the consideration of your application. 
1. University of Otago staff member responsible for project:    
Fleming Jean  Prof 
2. Department:  
The Centre for Science Communication 




4. Title of project: 
Encouraging Critical Thinking with the Scientific Method. 
5. Brief description in lay terms of the purpose of the project:  
The aim of this project is to interview students prior to and following a lesson aimed at 
demonstrating the importance of critical thinking and highlighting the scientific method. This is 
intended to determine if the specific emphases of the lesson are effective in encouraging 
critical thinking and an understanding of the scientific method and science in general. 
6. Indicate type of project and names of other investigators and students:  
Student Research    Names   
Research of the effectiveness of a simple 
lesson of the scientific method to encourage 










 Yes, in multiple schools over the course of 4 months. 
8. Intended start date of project: 
 15 June 2011 
Projected end date of project: 
15 October 2011 
9. Funding of project.    
 Is the project to be funded: 
(a) Internally   
(b) Externally 
 Please specify who is funding the project: 
 MSciComm student funding 
(If externally funded, will there be any commercial use made of the data and will potential 
participants be made aware of the external funding before they agree to participate? If not, 
please explain) 
10. Aim and description of project:  (Clearly specify aims)     
(a) To investigate the effectiveness of a simple lesson of the scientific method to encourage 
critical thinking.   
(b) To interview students about their understanding of the nature of science and the scientific 
method.. 
11. Researcher or instructor experience and qualifications in this research area: 
Andrew Sparrow has experience working as an educator having worked for 2 years as a science 
communicator at the Otago Museum. This role saw him primarily involved with school, 
preschool and social youth groups.  
He holds a BSc(Zoology and Ecology) and a PGDipSci(Zoology), and is in the 2nd year of his 
MSciComm.   






(Participants means any person whose behaviour, actions, condition, state of health the 
researcher proposes to study; or whose personal information the researcher proposes to collect 
or use) 
12(a) Population from which participants are drawn:  
Students of Kirsty McLachlan at East Otago High School  
Students of Amadeo Enrique Ballestero at John McGlashan High School 
Students of Trish Palmer at Balaclava School 
12(b) Specify inclusion and exclusion criteria: 
None 
12(c) Number of participants:  
~30 Students of East Otago High School 
~30 Students of John McGlashan High School 
~30 Students of Balaclava School 
12(d) Age range of participants: 
8 to 14 years old  
12(e) Method of recruitment: 
Contact with teaching staff at each school 
12(f) Please specify any payment or reward to be offered: 
No payments or rewards will be offered. 
13. Methods and Procedures: Describe the design of the study, the nature of the task 
required of participants and how the results will be analysed. The various precautionary 
measures to be taken to avoid harm or discomfort should be described (up to two pages; any 
questionnaire or survey form to be used must be attached). [If using body fluids or tissues please 







Andrew is visiting Balaclava Primary, East Otago High and John McGlashan High Schools to 
present a lesson aimed specifically at understanding the scientific methods and using critical 
thinking to problem solve. This will be largely accomplished by helping the students design and 
run simple experiments. 
As part of his thesis he wishes to interview students on their experience of the lesson and in 
particular, whether they show an improvement in their understanding of the scientific method 
and the greater appreciation of critical thinking. Student will also be encouraged to share what 
they have learned or learn in the future on a website called www.whatscienceis.com. He will 
not use the student’s given names, but select names from a list produced by a random name 
generator which uses data from the US Census (http://www.kleimo.com/random/name.cfm).  
This lesson will be preceded by a questionnaire given to the student to gauge their initial 
understanding of science and the scientific method, and their use of critical thinking. 
Additionally 30 students will be selected to answer questions in a short interview with Andrew. 
This process will be repeat one month after the initially lesson to assess any changes. 
All participating students will attend a single 50 minute session in their own classroom, 
presented by Andrew. 
This lesson is divided into three parts. Firstly the class will work through some experiments to 
demonstrate the fallibility of the human mind designed to demonstrate the importance of 
evidence and critical thinking, and understand why the scientific method is important. 
Secondly the students will design and conduct an experiment to provide evidence for simple 
questions provided by Andrew. This experiment will be conducted under close supervision of 
Andrew and the school staff; however will require significant involvement and ownership by 
the students. Potential experiments may involve the use of vacuum pumps, dry ice, and liquid 
nitrogen. Andrew has experience will all these utilities and possesses a liquid nitrogen handlers 
certificate with allows him to purchase, transport, store and use liquid nitrogen. 
The third part of the class is to summarise the results of the experiment and determine what 
conclusion we are able to derive. This part of the class will be design to help the student realise 
the limitations of a single study and combine their results. 
During the class an effort will be made to produce a photographic and video record of the 
experience. On the condition of consent from the student’s parents and teachers this media 






The photos and videos will be available for use by the school or for the parents of the students 
to view. Andrew Sparrow or the Centre for Science Communication may use the video in 
Science Communication seminars and presentations. 
14. Compliance with The Privacy Act 1993 and the Health Information Privacy Code 1994 
imposes strict requirements concerning the collection, use and disclosure of personal 
information.  These questions allow the Committee to assess compliance. 
14(a) Are you collecting personal information directly from the individual concerned? 
No, the research concentrates on the student’s ideas, thoughts and use of critical thinking and 
their understanding of the scientific method. No personal data will be published. 
14(b) If you are collecting personal information directly from the individual concerned, 
specify the steps taken to make participants aware of the following points: (you should make 
participants aware of these points in an Information Sheet for Participants; a suggested 
template is attached): 
A letter will be sent to parents advising that Andrew wishes to interview students about the 
lesson they are participating in as a part of his thesis. None of the students will be identified, 
and they will only be asked about the project as described in 14(a). 
14(c) If you are not making participants aware of any of the points in (b), please explain 
why: 
 Does not apply 
14(d) Does the research or teaching project involve any form of deception?   
No 
14(e) Please outline your storage and security procedures to guard against unauthorised 
access, use or disclosure and how long you propose to keep personal information: 
Prof Jean Fleming at the Centre will hold any notes/data/interview audio and videotapes at the 
Centre for  Science Communication for at least 5 years.   
14(f) Please explain how you will ensure that the personal information you collect is 
accurate, up to date, complete, relevant and not misleading: 






Any data which I intent to use on the website will first be viewed an consented to by the 
students and parents. 
14(g) Who will have access to personal information, under what conditions, and subject to 
what safeguards against unauthorised disclosure? (Personal information includes video tapes, 
audio tapes, transcripts of interviews etc. Although individuals do not need to be named, the 
positions of those with access to the data and their relationship to the research need to be 
listed. Will participants be given access to the data in its raw format? If not, this needs to be 
made clear to participants before they consent. Will the results of the research be provided or be 
made available to participants when the project is completed? This should also be made clear to 
participants before they consent to the project)  
Any photographs or video of the students will be available for students and parents to view, but 
not the research on teaching the scientific method as a mean of developing critical thinking. 
The data will be analysed by Andrew Sparrow and Prof Jean Fleming and results included in the 
written academic component of Andrew’s MSciComm thesis.  
14(h) Do you intend to publish any personal information and in what form do you intend to 
do this? 
The results of this research may be published in peer-reviewed science education journals and 
possible magazine articles. Any information will be published under the names of Andrew 
Sparrow and Prof Jean Fleming. Neither student names, nor the name of the school will be 
used. 
14(i) Do you propose to collect information on ethnicity?  
No 
15. Potential problems: Explain whether there will be harm or discomfort to participants, 
medical or legal problems, or problems of community relations or controversy, or whether 
any conflicts of interest might arise 
There is the possibility for injury during the lesson. Risks involved include dry ice burns or cold 
burns from liquid nitrogen, heat burns from hot plates and open flames. Andrew does not 
anticipate any problems will arise from his work.  
16. Informed consent   
Each student who participates in this research will be given a consent form as well as a form to 






Please attach the information sheet and the consent form to this application.  The information 
sheet and consent form must be separate.  
 At a minimum the Information Sheet must describe in lay terms: 
• the nature and purpose of the research; 
• the procedure and how long it will take;  
• any risk or discomfort involved; 
• who will have access and under what conditions to any personal information; 
• the eventual disposal of data collected; 
• the name and contact details of the staff member responsible for the project and an 
invitation to contact that person over any matter associated with the project; 
• details of remuneration offered for participation and compensation payable in the event 
of harm; 
• Exclusion criteria for the project if applicable including Health Concerns. (If exclusion  
 include a clear statement to the effect that: “People who meet one or more of the 
exclusion criteria set out above may not participate in this project, because in the opinion of the 
researchers and the University of Otago Human Ethics Committee, it involves unacceptable risk 
to them.”)  
 and any other relevant matters   
 The Information Sheet must conclude with the statement: "The University of Otago 
Human Ethics Committee has reviewed and approved this project."   
 The Consent Form must make it clear that a participant: 
• understands the nature of the proposal; 
• has had all questions satisfactorily answered; 
• is aware of what will become of the data (including video or audio tapes and data held 
electronically) at the conclusion of the project; 







• is aware of risks, remuneration and compensation; 
• is aware that the data may be published; 
• is aware that a third party (i.e. transcriber) may have access to the data; 
• is aware that every effort will be made to preserve the anonymity of the participant 
unless the participant gives an express waiver, which must be in addition to and separate from 
this consent form. 
(Applicants should use the pro forma Information Sheet and Consent Form provided by the 
University of Otago Human Ethics Committee, with appropriate adaptation, unless a case is 
made and approved that these formats would be inappropriate for the specific project; 
Research or teaching involving children or young persons require written consent from both the 
child or young person AND the parent/guardian unless an adequate justification is provided). 
17. Fast-Track procedure  (In exceptional and unexpected circumstances, and where the 
research needs to commence before the next monthly meeting of the University of Otago 
Human Ethics Committee, a researcher may request that the application be considered under 
the fast-track provisions).   
 Do you request fast-track consideration? (See Important Notes to Applicants attached) 
Yes 
(Please note that this involves the application being sent around members of the Committee by 
correspondence and can be expected to take 10 to 14 days) 
 If yes, please state specific reasons:- 
18. Other committees 
 If any other ethics committee has considered or will consider the proposal which is the 
subject of this application, please  give details: 
19. Applicant's Signature:   ....................................................................   
 Date:  ................................ 
 Please ensure that the person signing the application is the applicant (the staff member 
responsible for the research) rather than the student researcher. 






I have read this application and believe it to be scientifically and ethically sound.  I approve the 
research design. The Research proposed in this application is compatible with the University of 
Otago policies and I give my consent for the application to be forwarded to the University of 
Otago Human Ethics Committee with my recommendation that it be approved. 
 Signature of *Head of Department: ................................................................ 
 Date: ...................................... 
 *(In cases where the Head of Department is also the principal researcher then the 
appropriate Dean or Pro-Vice-Chancellor must sign) 










4.2 Consent Form 
The Centre for Science Communication 
The University of Otago 
Dear Parent/Caregiver 
I am student enrolled in Masters of Science Communication programme at the University of Otago. I am 
visiting school in the Otago Region, working with science classes. My particular area of interest is critical 
thinking and the scientific method. 
There are three parts to my involvement with the classes I meet: 
First I would like to interview the students to gauge their initial understanding of the nature of science, 
the scientific method and their use of critical thinking. 
Second I would like to host one class with the students. In this class I will cover material I have designed 
to entertain, as well as to demonstrate principles of the scientific method. This class will involve the 
design and execution of an experiment which involves the potential for harm. Specific risks involved may 
include burns from open flames/hot plates etc. and cold burn from the use of dry ice/ liquid nitrogen 
etc. All efforts will be made to run the experiments as safely as possible to minimize the risks involved. I 
conducted these experiments as a part of my job at Otago Museum Discovery World over a course of 2 
years without incident, and have received significant professional training the use of the substances and 
equipment I intend to use. Any parent who is not comfortable with any part of the lesson is welcomed 
to exclude their child from the experimental part of the lesson and participate in other parts of the 
lesson instead. Students are free to withdraw at any time. 
Thirdly I would like to re-interview the students after a period of at least 1 month. In this meeting I will 
cover the questions I covered in the first interview, and investigate if any of the specific messages of the 
class I presented are able to be recalled.   
As part of my thesis I wish to maintain a photographic and video record of the experience. I hope to use 
some of this material on a website I have created entitled www.whatscienceis.com. During the lesson I 
also hope to encourage the students to participate on the website by contributing their opinions and/or 
other material they produce.  
In all publications or presentations I will not use the student’s given names, but select names from a list 
produced by a random name generator. 
Please read the enclosed information sheet and if you are happy for your child to participate please sign 








I have read the Information Sheet concerning this project and understand what it is about.  I understand 
that I am free to request further information at any stage. 
1. I agree to  ____________________________________ participating in the project; 
2. I am free to withdraw my daughter/son from the project at any time without any disadvantage; 
3. Any notes/data/interview audio and videotapes will be held in secure storage at the Centre for 
Science Communication for at least 5 years, as required by the University's research policy. 
I agree to my daughter/son taking part in this project. 
 
 
.............................................................................  ............................... 








4.3 Information Sheet 
May 2011 
University of Otago 
The Centre for Science Communication 
INFORMATION SHEET FOR PARENTS/CAREGIVERS  
Please read this information sheet carefully before deciding whether or not to allow your daughter/son 
to participate.  If you decide to participate I thank you.  If you decide not to take part there will be no 
disadvantage to you of any kind and I thank you for considering my request. 
What is the Aim of the Project? 
This project is being undertaken as part of an MSciComm in the Centre for Science Communication, 
University of Otago. 
The main aim of this project is gauge students understanding of the scientific method, and to determine 
if simple engaging lessons can have a significant effect on this understanding.  
Potential for Harm. 
The lesson will include the development and execution of an experiment. This experiment may be 
potentially dangerous as it could include the use of very cold substances such as dry ice or liquid 
nitrogen or heat from flames or elements. 
All actions will be taken to reduce these risks. I have significant professional training and practical 
experience conducting these experiments. No experiments will be conducted without proper safety 
equipment and protocols. 
What data or information will be collected and what use will be made of it? 
The primary information I will collect will be in the form of interviews and questionnaires. I will also ask 
questions of the students during the class I present. This information will be used directly with my 
thesis, and may also feature in any presentation I give regarding my thesis. 
Additionally I will photograph some of the experiments and class work during the time I spend in the 
class room. On the condition of consent from parents and teachers this material may be exhibited on a 
website I have created as part of my thesis, called www.whatscienceis.com. 
 Any notes, data, interview audio, photographs and video will be held in secure storage at the Centre for 
Science Communication for at least 5 years, as required by the University's research policy. There is a 
possibility that due to unforeseen circumstances the data may also need to be view by a third party, 






Please be aware that you may decide your daughter/son will not to take part in the research without 
any disadvantage to them of any kind. 
If you have any questions about my project, either now or in the future, please feel free to contact:- 
Prof Jean Fleming 
The Centre for Science Communication  
 jean.fleming@otago.ac.nz 







4.4 Interview Questions 
Topic Question 
General What is science? 
Is there a goal to science? 
What kind of people do science? 
Why do scientist want to know about these things? 
How do scientist do their work? 
Ideas Where do scientist get their ideas from? 
What does a scientist do once they have an idea? 
Hypothesis What is a hypothesis? 
Experiment What is an experiment 
How does a scientist know what experiment they should do? 
Outcomes What does a scientist do if there experiment proves their hypothesis? 
What does a scientist do if there experiment disproves their hypothesis? 
 
 
Creative Component: WhatScienceIs.com 
Introduction 
To fulfil the creative component of my thesis, I decide to make a science themed 
website. The scope of the website was to provide a hub of interaction with schools and 
students which I had interacted with during my research; to provide information and resources 
for teachers, parents, or other guardians looking to conduct scientific activities with their 
children; to provide engaging and entertaining scientific information; and to try to promote a 
narrative about science that I had identified as being important during my research. I titled my 
website “WhatScienceIs.com”. Rather than link to this website, I will instead use this section 
to explain my journey in making it, as well as try to offer an explanation as to why it no longer 
exists. 
 
Intention of the site 
To make the website successful and not get lost in the vast expanses of the internet I 
decided to try and focus the material I was producing to work with the curriculum of schools I 
visited during my thesis research. I took the opportunity during these visits to talk to teachers 
and classes about what information and resources I could provide that would be useful. While 
this scope was initially small, I believed that by tailoring my website into a resource that could 
be utilised by local schools it could establish a core community of users from which a larger 
community could grow. Additionally, I believed that if site became an established resource 
being used in some classrooms, this would be useful for advertising my services to other 
teachers within these schools. I hoped this networking would lead to a positive feedback loop 
where the increasing popularity of my site would allow me more access to schools, students 
and teachers, which would in turn help to develop the content of the site.   
Beyond tailoring my site to be useful to 
teachers I was in communication with, I had a 
central narrative that I wanted the site to 
promote. This narrative was identified during 
my research. I wanted to communicate the 
importance of the scientific method, and why it 
is so important to a robust understanding of the 
world. To this end one of the first articles I 
produced for my site was what I called the 
“golden rules” (fig.1). These rules addressed 
the top misconceptions about science I had 
identified when conducting student interviews. 
This included the importance of a hypothesis being wrong, and why this was a good thing, and 
the importance of being able to say “I don’t know” rather than accept a flawed answer. I also 
included other information such as logical fallacies, to try and demonstrate the fallibility of 
thought, and thus demonstrate the importance of questioning our own mental processes, and 
in turn create an appreciation of the scientific method as a means to overcome these. 
To avoid the site becoming too dry I also made an attempt to provide interesting and 
entertaining articles, as well as links to other science media. Some of the articles I made for 
this purpose included: 
 How fast are you moving when you are sitting still? 
 Giant extinct versions of living animals 
 The worst smelling organisms 
 Your 6th, 7th, 8th, and 9th senses   
In an effort to make the site more engaging I also created a scale model of the solar system 
using html, created animated videos explaining the science of simple experiments, created 
animated optical illusions, and provided links to science themed web comics.  
Figure 1. The “Golden Rules" page of the site. 
Success of the site 
Unfortunately, my site was never 
as successful as I wished. The only part 
that was very well received were the free 
simple paper resources I made available 
on my site copywrite free (fig.2). Even 
after the site was no longer online I 
received several messages from 
teachers looking to get access to the 
activities I had hosted. To my knowledge, 
no students that I had directly engaged 
with had used my site. My tracking tools 
revealed only minor activity on the site at 
the best of times. I chose to allow 
commenting on the site using a tool 
called Disqus, but the handful of 
comments left were from international 
users (except for around ten comments left by friends and relatives). Only two articles I made 
were ever shared to Facebook, both were space themed content from my site, being shared 
to a private group I could not access.  
 
Why was the site unsuccessful? 
Many factors contributed to the lack of success of my site. At each of the schools I had 
visited to do my research, I had taken photos and film of the experiments I had conducted with 
the children. I had intended to use this material as a major part of the website. Unfortunately, 
a large proportion of the students consent forms (~50%) did not give me permission to use 
Figure 2. Example of some of the paper activities 
made available on the site 
their images. This hurt the development of my site as I was hoping this would not only provide 
my site with content, but also serve to advertise the kind of class I was presenting to other 
schools who may be interested in having me attend their own classes. This content would also 
lend legitimacy to my fledgling site. I attempted to refilm the experiments on my own, however 
I found it very difficult to produce these up to a standard I was happy to host on my website. 
It was also apparent to me that the same material was available from much larger and better 
funded organisations such as Steve Spangler Science. The absence of my classroom 
sessions from the website also made it less likely for students to feel a sense of ownership, or 
at least involvement with the site. I believe this significantly impacted chances for the site to 
be shared and interacted with by the students. 
A huge barrier to my website was my inexperience in website development. This was 
only the second website I had ever made, and it was a lot more complex than what I had 
previously achieved. I made a lot of novice mistakes while making my site, such as having the 
cascading style sheet (CSS) code written on each page separately, rather than linking to a 
separate master script. A lot of small errors such as this caused me to spend a great deal of 
time trying to fix inconsistencies, and on several occasions largely reengineering the site from 
the ground up. 
Additional to the extra work involved due to a lack of experience, was the work involved 
due to a lack of budget. It was very difficult to populate the site with images that were free of 
copyright, of a high enough standard, and which fit the aesthetic I was hoping for on the site. 
Many hours were spent trying to trace down the origins of images I had found that I wished to 
use, to guarantee proper attribution and be sure that I was not violating any usage rights. I 
also spent a great deal of time creating or modifying images to be more clear, or to fit within 
the theme of a page. An example off this is demonstrated in Figure 3.  These images were 
two of ten created for the article “Giant extinct versions of living animals”. To accurately 
communicate the size disparity between the extinct animal and the living relative, I was 
required to source images of the extinct animal and the living version that were free of 
copyright restrictions. I then combined these 
images into a single image that presented the 
message clearly, but also followed the standard 
theme of the page. Adding to this, I decided to 
incorporate a lot of animation to make the site feel 
more lively.  In total, I made 26 animations of 
various complexity. 
My lack of experience and inability to 
purchase assets for the site were limiting and the 
site grew slower than I had originally hoped, 
however after some time it developed into a site 
that I was pleased with. I had also received 
feedback from other science communicators that 
they were impressed with what I was doing. I do not know if it would have been useful for me 
in networking and providing resources for schools if it still existed today. If I ever decided to 
repeat this endeavour, I would have simply created a blog. This would have required much 
less coding and a functional, useful site would have been available more quickly. Additionally, 
I could have focused on content that was well received and wasted a lot less time trying to 
develop material that was not utilised by the website visitors. 
 
Why it no longer exists. 
By far the biggest issue my website faced was my experience with hosting it online. 
Before I decided on a hosting service I identified the best deals, and made my selection based 
upon customer feedback. I decided to go with a hosting company called BlueHost. My 
experience with them was initially reasonably good. My only issue was that they were based 
in the United States, so calling for customer assistance was expensive. I managed to have my 
Figure 3. Example of imaged created for the 
site 
site up and running, and could make changes and update it easily. However, the hosting 
service was rather bothersome when sending me advertising material and “special offers” 
causing me to create an email filter for their communication.  
One day when I attempted to log on to my website to show a friend, I was instead 
directed to the BlueHost homepage. Initially I assumed the hosting service must be down, as 
I was only eight months into my two-year hosting plan. The site did not come back up within a 
couple of days, so I checked to see if others were having any difficulties. When I tried to log 
into my account with BlueHost, I found I no longer had access. I immediacy contacted 
BlueHost technical support and received the following response: 
 
This was a very concerning email, as I was dreading the possibility of having to pay for 
hosting again as it was several hundred dollars. I also did not understand why my site had a 
“very large database” as it was not very popular, and wondered if this was something I had 
caused myself. One of the pages on my site was a “Scale Model of the Solar System”. On this 
page, I used frames to space out scaled images of the sun and planets to represent the solar 
system accurately. For smaller planets to be larger than a few pixels (and thus visible), I had 
to made the sun 900 pixels in diameter. The page included all planets up until Neptune. On a 
display showing 96dpi this would make the page about 800 meters long. I assumed this page 
was the “large database” in question. However this was also one of only two pages that had 
been shared to Facebook, and I had received very positive feedback from other science 
communicators about it, so I was reluctant to remove it. I spent time trying to research why it 
could have been an issue, and how I could resolve the issue without removing the page 
altogether. I called technical support to try and solve the problem and was told that this page 
was unlikely to be the issue and that if I wanted to find a resolution I would need to get a ticket 
for live chat support to walk me through it. The live chat support was unlike anything I could 
have imagined. It will be remembered as one of the most infuriating and frustrating 
experiences of my life. Following is the transcript of the conversation: 
TechSupport: Hello, how can I help you? 
Me: I have been locked out due to a database causing lag. 
TechSupport: Yes I can see the database. 
Me: Oh, so can you tell me what it is? 
TechSupport: No, I don’t have that information 
Me: So what is a database in this context, what does it do? 
Techsupport: it is a database, it contains information. 
Me: What repercussion will it have to my site if I delete it? 
Techsupport: if it is required for your site, your site will not work. 
 
The conversation carried on in this manner without a single satisfactory answer to help me 
solve my issue. After multiple phone calls and a live chat with technical support I still did not 
know what the issue was, how to deal with it, or even what a database was. 
Eventually I had a breakthrough purely by chance. Once I was allowed to sign back 
into my account at BlueHost, I was exploring the control panel features and found a section of 
the control panel which was titled “databases”. As it turns out free site add-ons you can use 
such as WordPress blogs, bulletin boards or other third party applications are classified as 
“databases”. I had not implemented any of these features in my website as Discus provided 
all the functionality I required, however when I had first logged into my account I had installed 
the bulletin board application to see if it would be useful to me and test it out. I had decided 
against it and thought no more about it. Unfortunately, the board continued to exist on my 
website as I had never uninstalled it. This board was then located by spam-bots who 
eventually posted so much spam it was causing server lag. I was never aware of this as I had 
never checked my BlueHost email filter sending me warning about the spam, and because 
the bulletin board was not link to from any part of my site.  
Once I had all the information, it was a simple click of a button to solve this problem. I 
sent an email to BlueHost letting them know I had resolved the issue, and my account was 
fully reinstated. At this point I realised there was a bigger issue. I had been informed in the 
earlier email that WhatScienceIs.com is currently registered with GoDaddy. I ignored this as 
meaningless tech talk at the time, however I now began to understand the issue. I was logged 
in to the control panel for the username WhatScienceIs.com, for the website by the same 
name that I had made. However, the domain name that I had registered, the internet address 
“WhatScienceIs.com”, was a separate entity. As soon as my site was suspended for violating 
terms of service due to the database lag, the domain name was put on the free market, and 
was now owned by GoDaddy. This company, like many others, use bots to buy any expiring 
or suspended domain names so that they can turn a profit in selling them back to those who 
created the websites. So, my website still existed, but there was no realistic means to access 
it. 
Still desperate to save my site, I registered a new domain name WhatScienceIs.org, 
and began the task of rebranding my website to the new name. Unfortunately, this meant that 
any links I had sent out to the site no longer worked, and I received emails from several 
teachers asking how they could get access again. I informed them of the change, however, 
deeper issues prevented the site from functioning properly anymore.  
Foolishly when making the website, I had made many of the links call to the domain 




<a href="../activities/activities.html">  
This resulted in no links on any page I had made working, requiring me to update every link 
within my site to make it function again. Additionally, I needed to completely rebrand the site 
to the new ‘.org’ domain name. This included many animations for which I had unfortunately 
saved over the source files for, as well as all resources made available on the site such as in 
Figure 2 which were all made available in .PDF, .AI and .JPEG file formats. Even the 
thumbnails of images I made needed rebranding. At this point any success my site had had 
was reset to zero as it could no longer be accessed by anyone who had the links, and it 
required a massive rebuild to be able to be functional again. I was simply overwhelmed by the 
work involved in doing do, so I reached out to the company currently auctioning my old domain 
name. This was the response: 
 
I decided the damage had already been done, and the site was not worth $800 to me. 
